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SHOULD MUTUAL FUNDS  
INVEST IN STARTUPS? 
A CASE STUDY OF FIDELITY MAGELLAN 
FUND’S INVESTMENTS IN UNICORNS (AND 
OTHER STARTUPS) AND THE REGULATORY 
IMPLICATIONS* 
JEFF SCHWARTZ** 
Mutual funds are acting like venture capitalists. Contrary to 
longstanding practice and to their reputation for investing in 
public companies, mutual funds, including some of the most 
prominent, are allocating portions of their portfolios to private 
venture-stage firms, including famous unicorns like Airbnb and 
Uber. Through a case study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s startup 
portfolio, this Article analyzes the regulatory implications of this 
development. I argue that the new interest in venture investing 
poses several potential investor-protection concerns: lack of 
awareness among mutual fund investors, lack of liquidity for 
mutual fund shares, lack of venture capital expertise among 
mutual fund management, and lack of accountability over how 
funds value their ownership stakes in startups for purposes of 
calculating their net asset values, which creates an opportunity 
for management to manipulate such estimates. 
Based on Magellan’s practices, liquidity is not a salient concern, 
but the other gaps appear significant. Magellan’s disclosures on 
its website, and in its prospectus, statement of additional 
information, and quarterly reports, provide investors with little 
meaningful information about the fund’s investments in startups. 
They also provide nothing to suggest that Magellan has 
experience in this area. At the same time, however, the fund 
reports returns from its startup portfolio that far exceed the 
public market and the average in the venture capital industry. 
While exceptional performance from a novice does not prove 
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misconduct, it reinforces concerns about the dependability of 
fund valuations. 
To address the above risks, I suggest new rules governing how 
mutual funds value their startup investments, which tie changes 
to objective evidence, and new disclosure requirements that 
would shed light on the rationale for valuation changes and 
provide mutual fund investors with notice that startups are in 
their portfolios and that these investments pose certain risks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much has been made of the proliferation of “unicorns,” startups 
with valuations of at least $1 billion.1 The neologism, coined at a time 
when such firms were rare,2 now comes with an ironic twist, as these 
firms now seem to be everywhere.3 One trend that has fueled their 
rise, but attracted far less attention than the unicorns themselves, is 
that mutual funds—the somewhat stodgy savings tool for retail 
investors with an eye towards retirement4—have begun to act like 
venture capital funds—the flashy portfolio ornament for wealthy 
individuals and institutional investors.5 In a break with their past, 
mutual funds have begun investing significant sums in these young 
private firms.6 
 
 1. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Main Street Portfolios Are Investing in Unicorns, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook
/main-street-portfolios-are-investing-in-unicorns.html [https://perma.cc/X4GR-WGFX]. 
 2. See Aileen Lee, Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion-Dollar 
Startups, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/welcome-to-
the-unicorn-club/ [https://perma.cc/5K4S-DR5U] (coining the term). 
 3. See Scott Austin, Chris Canipe & Sarah Slobin, The Billion Dollar Startup Club, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2015), http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club/ [https://perma.cc
/D57A-THDL] (showing list and valuation of firms as of May 2017); Ben Zimmer, How 
‘Unicorns’ Became Silicon Valley Companies, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2015, 10:26 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-unicorns-became-silicon-valley-companies-1426861606. 
 4.  See Kimberly Burham, Michael Bogdan & Daniel Schrass, Characteristics of 
Mutual Fund Investors, 2014, 20 ICI RES. PERSP., no. 9, Nov. 2014, at 1, 
https://www.idc.org/pdf/per20-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZY5-JU7Q]. 
 5. See Chad Brooks, What Is Venture Capital?, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Apr. 1, 2013, 
12:16 PM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4252-venture-capital.html [https://perma.cc
/F8S2-ESKJ]. 
 6. See Sergey Chernenko, Josh Lerner & Yao Zeng, Mutual Funds as Venture 
Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns 30 fig.1 (Jan. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897254 [https://perma.cc/TW93-7U9C 
(staff-uploaded archive)]; Tim McLaughlin & Heather Somerville, U.S. Mutual Funds 
Boost Own Performance with Unicorn Mark-Ups, REUTERS (Aug. 11, 2016, 7:03 AM), 
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This Article analyzes the regulatory implications that arise from 
mutual funds amassing venture-capital-type portfolios. I argue that 
their investments in startups pose several potential concerns. One is 
investor awareness. Since venture investing runs counter to historical 
practices,7 mutual fund investors might not realize that their funds are 
purchasing these atypical assets. Another concern is liquidity. 
Investors expect to be able to redeem mutual fund shares nearly 
instantly.8 Since startups are private, however, their shares do not 
trade on a liquid market, which makes it more difficult for mutual 
funds to meet their shareholders’ redemption expectations. 
Finally, these investments raise concerns about competence and 
candor. Mutual fund portfolio managers are not typically experts in 
venture capital valuation, which casts their investing decisions in this 
arena into doubt. Moreover, once they have made these investments, 
funds are required to value them each day.9 With no market price to 
go on, the valuations are within management’s discretion.10 The 
values managers posit impact the price that shareholders receive 
when they cash out and what newcomers pay when they invest.11 
Because mutual fund managers lack the experience and expertise to 
appropriately value their startup holdings, these prices might be 
inaccurate. 
Fund discretion in valuation also creates the potential for 
misconduct. Funds are incentivized to choose high values, which 
among other benefits to the fund, makes them appear more successful 
than their peers and increases the fees collected from investors.12 
They might also be tempted to smooth returns, that is, report losses 
 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-valuations-idUSKCN10M0CP [https://perma.cc/7NQ2-
TUJ9]. 
 7. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
 8. See Mutual Funds and Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs)—A Guide for Investors, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm [https://perma
.cc/GQF7-LJCQ] [hereinafter Guide for Investors] (last updated Jan. 26, 2017). 
 9. See 17 C.F.R. §	270.22c-1(b)(1) (2016). 
 10. See infra Section II.C. 
 11. See infra Section II.C.1. 
 12. See infra Section II.C.3. While this concern has drawn little attention, funds have 
made headlines for marking down the values of their startups. See, e.g., Rolfe Winkler, 
Fidelity Marks Down Startups Including Dropbox, Zenefits, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2016, 
1:34 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fidelity-marks-down-startups-including-dropbox-
zenefits-1459346847; Rolfe Winkler, T. Rowe Price Marks Down Most of Its Tech Startups, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2016, 6:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/t-rowe-price-marks-
down-most-of-its-tech-startups-1460759094. 
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and gains when most advantageous for the fund rather than when 
they occur.13 
This range of concerns should sound familiar to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). While mutual fund interest 
in startups is a new phenomenon, many have long invested in other 
illiquid assets, such as mature private firms14 and thinly traded debt 
instruments,15 which expose investors to risks similar to those noted 
above.16 That being the case, the securities laws contain rules that are 
at least partially responsive. The pertinent issues are, therefore, 
whether the existing, generally applicable, regulatory regime is 
sufficiently robust to handle venture-capital style investing or 
whether, and if so what, specially tailored rules might be advisable. I 
argue that entry into this new arena presents novel types and degrees 
of risk and, because of this, suggest targeted reforms that would 
mitigate the investor-protection concerns that result. 
To assess the extent to which risks to investors remain despite 
existing safeguards, I describe the relevant rules, present a case study 
of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s compliance therewith, and scrutinize the 
fund’s startup valuations. Magellan is an iconic mutual fund. It is 
actively managed,17 which means its portfolio managers select 
securities with the hopes of beating the stock market’s return rather 
than duplicating it like an index fund,18 and it has about $15 billion in 
assets and 156 million shares outstanding,19 making it one of the 
 
 13. For a discussion of smoothing, see AHMED RIAHI-BELKAOUI, ACCOUNTING 
THEORY 56 (5th ed. 2004). 
 14. See Restricted Securities, Accounting Series Release No. 113, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 5847, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,989, 19,989 (Oct. 21, 1969). 
 15. See generally Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Securities 
Act Release No. 9616, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736 (July 23, 2014) [hereinafter Money Market 
Fund Reform] (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 274, 279) (discussing mutual fund 
investments in illiquid debt). 
 16. Mutual fund liquidity has arisen as a concern at the SEC of late, as funds have 
increasingly diversified their holdings. See Kara M. Stein, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Mutual Funds—The Next 75 Years, Address to the Brookings Institution 
(June 15, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/mutual-funds-the-next-75-years-
stein.html#_ftnref35 [https://perma.cc/7U4U-98PX]. 
 17. See Brett Owens, Secure Your Retirement with These Top 4 Fidelity Funds, 
FORBES (Jan. 29, 2017, 8:36 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brettowens/2017/01/29
/secure-your-retirement-with-these-top-4-fidelity-funds/#7e31cd603e0c [https://perma.cc
/6UPF-GB9A (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 18. See VANGUARD, ACTIVE AND PASSIVE INVESTING: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 
2 (2016), https://www.vanguard.co.uk/documents/adv/literature/client_material/active-
passive-investing-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JX4-Y6UK]. 
 19. See Fidelity Magellan Fund: Summary, FIDELITY, https://fundresearch.fidelity.com
/mutual-funds/summary/316184100 [https://perma.cc/MYZ5-4QCL]. The number of shares 
was calculated by dividing portfolio net assets by the fund’s net asset value. 
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largest and most popular actively managed equity mutual funds.20 
Most significantly, the fund is also an active investor in unicorns and, 
as it turns out, other startups.21 
There are several reasons why Magellan is an attractive fund on 
which to focus. Because it is an industry leader with the resources to 
hire top counsel, its valuation processes and compliance activities are 
likely suggestive of larger industry practices, and, more specifically, 
because it is a Fidelity fund, its practices are likely suggestive of those 
in Fidelity’s fund family, which has been at the forefront of startup 
investing.22 In addition, even if Magellan is an outlier in its approach 
to these securities, to the extent its practices raise investor-protection 
concerns, its scale means that a significant number of individuals 
could be harmed. This alone would warrant regulatory scrutiny. 
Based on the above three-step analysis of risk, regulation, and 
case-study data, I conclude that, while liquidity does not appear to be 
a concern, there is reason to suspect that investors fail to realize that 
their mutual funds are investing in unicorns (and potentially other 
startups), that mutual fund investments in these securities are 
inadequately informed, and that the valuations that mutual funds 
report publicly and serve as the basis of redemptions and purchases 
may be inflated. The most significant findings are that Magellan’s 
disclosures surrounding its startup investments and its valuation 
practices are opaque, and that its reported valuations indicate that the 
fund has done surprisingly well with this portion of its portfolio.23 Its 
reported returns far outpace its other investments, the venture capital 
industry, and the public markets.24 Such success does not necessarily 
indicate misconduct—it may owe to luck or skill that belies the fund’s 
inexperience. Greater oversight, however, would provide increased 
confidence that the outstanding performance owes to these benign 
explanations. 
While a study solely of Magellan’s practices cannot prove reform 
is necessary, the findings and analysis herein lend credence to 
 
 20. See William Baldwin, Mutual Fund Ratings: The Biggest Domestic-Stock Funds, 
FORBES (June 26, 2015, 5:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/baldwin/2015/06/26
/mutual-fund-ratings-the-biggest-domestic-stock-funds/#4d7d69dd276b [https://perma
.cc/M5HY-C4LQ (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 21. See infra Table 1. 
 22. See Chernenko et al., supra note 6, at 19; Beth Healy, Fidelity Funds High on Hot 
Startups, BOS. GLOBE (Jan 13, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/01/13
/fidelity-funds-high-hot-startups/ZzJMQHiFbLjBMsd2MNSNxM/story.html [https://perma.cc
/A9HH-D2PS (staff-uploaded archive)].  
 23. See infra Sections II.C.5.c, II.C.6.c. 
 24. See infra Section II.C.6.c. 
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investor-protection concerns and, therefore, suggest that reforms are 
worth consideration. I argue for stricter rules regarding startup 
valuation methods and enhanced disclosures related to the venture 
portion of fund portfolios.25 
To limit the discretion over valuations that funds enjoy today, I 
suggest that rules should mandate valuation changes when, and only 
when, they are based on publicly available information. Funds would 
also be required to publicly disclose the information on which such 
changes are based. To improve investor awareness, I propose rules 
that would mandate prominent disclosure of the presence of venture-
stage investments and the risks they pose. Disclosures of varying 
length and specificity would be necessary in certain advertisements 
and in several mandated filings, including the fund’s prospectus (its 
primary sales document) and its statement of additional information 
(the “SAI”) (a supplement to the prospectus with additional detail), 
the latter of which would contain a separate section devoted to the 
startup portion of the fund’s portfolio. This combination of 
substantive restraints and additional transparency requirements 
would enhance the credibility of valuations and provide investors with 
adequate notice that their fund is involved in the venture capital 
arena.26 
Part I of this Article describes the rise of unicorns and the 
corresponding rise of mutual fund investments therein, the history of 
Fidelity’s Magellan Fund, and the makeup of Magellan’s venture-
stage portfolio. In Part II, I discuss the investor-protection concerns 
that mutual fund investments in venture-stage firms give rise to and 
assess—through a juxtaposition of the current regulatory structure 
against Magellan’s investing, valuation, and compliance practices—
whether today’s regulations are sufficient to protect investors. The 
analysis reveals gaps with respect to investor awareness and fund 
valuation practices for emerging firms. Part III proposes reforms that 
would mitigate these concerns. 
 
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. Because investors have historically shown muted interest in fund disclosures, 
mandating additional transparency would have only a qualified impact. See ABT SRBI, 
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS TELEPHONE SURVEY 56, 78 (2008), https://www
.sec.gov/pdf/disclosuredocs.pdf [https://perma.cc/WER9-RW67] (finding that almost two-
thirds of a sample of 1000 investors rarely, very rarely, or never read mutual fund 
prospectuses). Improved disclosures, however, would reach some investors, and provide 
constructive notice that legitimizes the new practice of investing in startups. Disclosure 
reform therefore serves as a worthwhile complement to the substantive portion of this 
Article’s proposal, which would protect everyone regardless of their willingness and ability 
to read and understand fund disclosure documents. 
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I.  UNICORNS, MUTUAL FUNDS, AND MAGELLAN 
A. The Proliferation of Unicorns 
Unicorns have upended norms in entrepreneurial capital raising, 
and, in so doing, have captured the attention of a growing number of 
mutual fund managers. There are currently 157 unicorns,27 with 
Dropbox, Airbnb, and Uber among the most famous. Indeed, all of 
these companies are valued at over $10 billion, which qualifies them 
for “decacorn” status.28 Like these well-known firms, unicorns tend, 
by and large, to be Silicon Valley-based technology companies.29 
Conventionally, companies with such rich valuations would go 
public to allow founders, employees, and early-stage investors to cash 
in on the firm’s success. Unicorns, however, have shunned this path.30 
Travis Kalanick, the controversial CEO of Uber, captured the 
prevailing sentiment when he said that he would take the company 
public “one day before [his] employees and significant others come to 
[his] office with pitchforks and torches.”31 
To remain private, these companies raise money under 
Rule	506(b) of the securities laws.32 So long as they limit participation 
to “accredited investors” and comply with several other restrictions, 
the rule allows them to collect round after round of venture capital 
without having to publicly register or provide investors with any 
specific disclosures.33 The rules define accredited investors as 
 
 27. See Austin et al., supra note 3. 
 28. See id.; Sarah Frier & Eric Newcomer, The Fuzzy, Insane Math That’s Creating So 
Many Billion-Dollar Tech Companies, BLOOMBERG: TECH (Mar. 17, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insane-math-that-s-creating-
so-many-billion-dollar-tech-companies [https://perma.cc/NTD5-XHE8] (noting use of the 
“decacorn” terminology). 
 29. See Frier & Newcomer, supra note 28. 
 30. See Jim Kerstetter, Daily Report: When Employees Want to Cash Out Private 
Stock, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/technology/daily-
report-when-employees-want-to-cash-out-private-stock.html [https://perma.cc/TZ2L-
5W7W] (“It has become common wisdom among tech start-ups that an initial public 
offering of shares is something that should occur only after all other options have been 
exhausted.”). 
 31. Kevin Maney, Silicon Valley Is Hoarding Wealth by Skipping IPOs, NEWSWEEK 
(June 27, 2016, 9:25 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/07/08/silicon-valley-unicorns-
ipo-474898.html [https://perma.cc/TCU9-QZBA]. For a broader discussion on the decline 
in IPOs and potential explanations, see generally Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity 
Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531 (2012). 
 32. See 17 C.F.R. §	230.506(b) (2016); see also Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: 
Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 592 (2016) (“Typically 
venture-backed companies rely on Rule 506(b)	.	.	.	.”). 
 33. See §	230.506(b). 
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individuals and institutions that meet certain financial thresholds.34 
Individuals must have a net worth of greater than $1 million 
(excluding their principal residence) or sustained income of greater 
than $200,000 per year,35 while institutions must have greater than $5 
million in assets.36 
Typical startup investors include “angels” and venture capital 
funds.37 Angels tend to be wealthy individuals who qualify as 
accredited investors.38 Venture capital funds range in size, but they 
can have over a billion dollars in assets under management in their 
family of funds.39 The investors in venture capital funds, technically 
limited partners, are all accredited.40 It is only recently that mutual 
funds have shown interest in putting their enormous resources behind 
emerging firms.41 Funds from the largest families, including 
Vanguard, Fidelity, and Blackrock, have lately begun steering 
investor assets toward unicorns.42 Allocations have risen sharply over 
the last few years and now total over $10 billion spread across over 
250 funds,43 with Fidelity’s funds leading the way.44 And while nascent 
statistics focus on unicorn investments, other startups might be on 
fund ledgers as well. One surprise from this Article’s study of 
Fidelity’s Magellan Fund is that it has reached beyond these giants of 
the startup world.45 
While angel and venture capital investing is generally confined to 
accredited investors, anyone can invest in the mutual funds run by 
these well-known fund families and their peers.46 Mutual fund 
 
 34. See id. §	230.501(a). 
 35. See id. §	230.501(a)(6)–(7). 
 36. See id. §	230.501(a)(3). 
 37. See Stephen G. Morrissette, A Profile of Angel Investors, 10 J. PRIV. EQUITY 52, 
52 (2007). 
 38. See id. at 54. 
 39. See Tanya Benedicto Klich, VC 100: The Top Investors in Early-Stage Startups, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/242702 [https://
perma.cc/M3KY-RK5F]. 
 40. See Jeffrey Estes, Benedict Kwon & Michael Brown, Venture Capital Investment 
in the United States: Market and Regulatory Overview, PRAC. L. (Mar. 1, 2015), http://us
.practicallaw.com/7-501-0057?source=relatedcontent [https://perma.cc/KXD6-ZGNG]. 
 41. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
 42. Scott Austin et al., Startup Stock Tracker, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2017, 1:20 PM), 
http://graphics.wsj.com/tech-startup-stocks-to-watch/ [https://perma.cc/K22B-K27S] (charting 
mutual fund investments in startup stocks). 
 43. See Chernenko et al., supra note 6, at 30 fig.1.  
 44. Id. at 19; Healy, supra note 22.  
 45. See infra Table 1.  
 46. See Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 521, 521 (2009); see also MUTUAL FUND EDUC. CTR., http://mfea.com
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investors are not wealthy individuals seeking out risky investments in 
young companies. They are retail investors, many of whom take part 
in mutual funds through their workplace 401(k) plans.47 While angels 
and venture capital limited partners are likely to be sophisticated 
parties (or at the very least have an interest in and understanding of 
investing), mutual fund investors likely give investing little thought. 
They may even fear and dislike investing, but participate in mutual 
funds anyway because they have no other option to save for 
retirement.48 They are among the least sophisticated investors in the 
securities markets.49 If anyone needs protection in the venture capital 
space, it is them. 
B. Fidelity’s Magellan Fund 
Magellan concentrates its investing in the publicly traded equities 
of large U.S. companies, but it has a pronounced newfound interest in 
startups.50 Founded in 1963, Magellan grew from $18 million in assets 
under management in 1977 to $19 billion in 1990 under the acclaimed 
investor, Peter Lynch, who averaged a 29.2% annual return.51 Even 
after Lynch’s tenure, the fund continued to prosper. In 2000, it was 
worth $110 billion.52 
More recently, however, Magellan has struggled. Over the last 
ten years, it has trailed the S&P 500 Index, as well as peer funds.53 As 
 
/learn/mutual_funds/why_mutual_funds/content_tabbed/default.fs [https://perma.cc/K6ZU-
Y7L4]. 
 47. See Jeff Schwartz, Rethinking 401(k)s, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 53, 56–57 (2012); see 
also Investing in Your 401(k), FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.finra.org/investors
/investing-your-401k [https://perma.cc/8D43-8TKP]. 
 48. See Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 256–57 
(2010); see also Investing in Your 401(k), supra note 47. 
 49. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48. Ninety-seven percent of mutual fund 
shares are owned by individual investors rather than institutions. See Sean Collins, The 
IMF on Asset Management: Sorting the Retail and Institutional Investor “Herds”, ICI 
VIEWPOINTS (June 4, 2015), https://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_15_imf_gfsr_05 [https://
perma.cc/RQE9-LYQF]. 
 50. See Fidelity Magellan Fund: Composition, FIDELITY, https://fundresearch.fidelity
.com/mutual-funds/composition/316184100 [http://perma.cc/754G-XQ9Q] (showing 
composition as of March 31, 2017). 
 51. Matthew Schifrin, Peter Lynch: 10-Bagger Tales, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2009, 6:00 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/23/lynch-fidelity-magellan-personal-finance_peter_lynch
.html [https://perma.cc/46A7-AKMR (staff-uploaded archive)]; see also Fidelity Magellan 
Fund: Summary, supra note 19. 
 52. Eleanor Laise, Can Anyone Steer This Ship?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2011, 12:01 
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704547604576263183921903172.  
 53. See FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS 5 (May 28, 2016) [hereinafter 
FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS]; see also Fidelity Magellan Fund: Summary, 
supra note 19. 
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a result, it has suffered massive shareholder redemptions54 and 
currently has assets under management of $15.5 billion, a large figure 
to be sure but one well beneath its peak.55 While Magellan is still one 
of the largest equity mutual funds, its rivals have gained at its 
expense.56 
The fund is also likely a victim of broader headwinds facing 
actively managed mutual funds. Empirical evidence has shown that 
investing in such funds is a poor choice. They routinely yield subpar 
returns and charge high fees, leaving investors worse off than if they 
had put their money in passively managed index funds.57 While the 
futility of active management has been known for some time,58 this 
knowledge has only recently had a major impact on investor decision 
making. Index funds are now seizing sizable chunks of market share.59 
In fact, the threat index funds pose may partially explain the startup-
investing trend. Since there is no venture-capital index for passively 
managed funds to track, they cannot follow actively managed funds 
into this unexplored territory. 
The Table below shows Magellan’s venture investments.60 It has 
invested a total of about $134 million since the second quarter of 2012 
(when its interest in startups appears to have begun).61 It held 
seventeen unique investments in twelve companies during the period 
 
 54. See Katy Marquardt, Fidelity Magellan on Its New Course, KIPLINGER (Nov. 16, 
2006), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/investing/T041-C009-S001-fidelity-magellan-on-its-
new-course.html [https://perma.cc/7C3U-KNZM]. 
 55. See Fidelity Magellan Fund: Summary, supra note 19 (showing $15.5 billion in 
portfolio net assets as of May 3, 2017); see also Laise, supra note 52. 
 56. See Baldwin, supra note 20 (including a table showing Magellan’s recent size 
ranking among top equity funds). 
 57. See Laise, supra note 52. 
 58. See, e.g., Anne M. Tucker, The Outside Investor: Citizen Shareholders & 
Corporate Alienation, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 99, 139 (2013) (noting that “[t]he fees 
associated with active management and attempts to consistently beat the market are 
‘widely believed by experts to be a futile practice.’	”(quoting Matthew D. Hutcheson, 
Uncovering and Understanding Hidden Fees in Qualified Retirement Plans, 15 ELDER L.J. 
323, 345 (2007))). 
 59. See id.; Jason Zweig, Are Index Funds Eating the World?, WALL ST. J.: 
MONEYBEAT (Aug. 26, 2016, 11:46 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/08/26/are-
index-funds-eating-the-world/.  
 60. The data in the table is based upon Fidelity Magellan Fund’s quarterly N-CSR 
and N-Q reports filed with the SEC between June 2012 and March 2016. For a collection 
of these filings and reports, see generally EDGAR Search Results: Fidelity Magellan Fund 
CIK#: 0000061397, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar
?company=fidelity+magellan&match=&CIK=&filenum=&State=&Country=&SIC=&owner
=exclude&Find=Find+Companies&action=getcompany [https://perma.cc/JYP7-VDRZ]. 
 61. I reviewed all SEC quarterly filings going back to the fourth quarter of 2009 until 
March 2016. No startup investments appeared prior to the June 2012 filing. See id. 
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under review—the sixteen quarters beginning June 2012 and ending 
March 2016. While seven out of Magellan’s twelve venture 
investments are in unicorns, the Table shows that Magellan has been 
willing to invest in smaller startups as well. In addition, two of the 
firms—Meituan and Mobileye—are international companies (China- 
and Israel-based, respectively).62 Some of the firms listed below have 
gone public, but they were all private at the time of Magellan’s 
acquisition. 
 
Table 1: Fidelity Magellan Fund Startup Investments 
 
Company 
Acquisition 
Date 
Acquisition 
Price per 
Share ($) 
Investment 
Amount ($) 
Security 
Purchased 
bluebird bio, Inc.* July 23, 2012 .50 1,711,000 Preferred Series D 
Cloudflare, Inc.† Nov. 5, 2014 6.13 3,502,000 Preferred Series D 
DocuSign, Inc.† 
Oct. 21, 2013 5.56 90,000 Common 
Stock 
Mar. 3, 2014 13.18 99,000 Preferred Series B 
Mar. 3, 2014 13.34 30,000 Preferred Series B-1 
June 29, 2012 4.64 11,000,000 
Preferred 
Series D 
Mar. 3, 2014 13.17 71,000 
Mar. 3, 2014 13.13 1,831,000 Preferred Series E 
HubSpot, Inc.* Oct. 25, 2012 5.62 15,000,000 Preferred 
Series E 
KaloBios 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.* 
May 2, 2012 3.40 8,000,000 Preferred Series E 
Malwarebytes Inc. Dec. 21, 2015 10.37 35,000,000 Preferred Series B 
Meituan Corp.† Jan. 26, 2015 6.32 10,000,000 Preferred Series D 
Mobileye N.V.*† Aug. 15, 2013 34.90 8,878,000 
Preferred 
Series F 
Nutanix, Inc.† Aug. 26, 2014 13.40 6,193,000 Preferred Series E 
 
 62. See About Us, MOBILEYE, http://www.mobileye.com/about/ [https://perma.cc
/YQZ6-AENP]; Meituan.com, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization
/meituan-com#/entity [https://perma.cc/J2Q3-5Z4P (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
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Company Acquisition 
Date 
Acquisition 
Price per 
Share ($) 
Investment 
Amount ($) 
Security 
Purchased 
Pure Storage Inc.*† Aug. 22, 2013 6.93 2,121,000 Preferred 
Series E 
Roku, Inc. 
May 7, 2013 .91 11,000,000 Preferred Series F 
Oct. 1, 2014 1.30 5,000,000 Preferred Series G 
Uber 
Technologies, Inc.† 
June 6, 2014 62.05 15,000,000 Preferred 
Series D 
  Total 134,526,000  
* Indicates that the company has gone public. 
† Indicates that the company is a “unicorn.” 
 
The following timeline provides a sense of the scale and timing of 
these investments. Since its first investment in May 2012, Magellan 
has consistently backed several startups a year. It had never invested 
more than $15 million until more than tripling that amount in its 
latest $35 million bet on Malwarebytes.63 
 
Figure 1: Fidelity Magellan Startup Investments Timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The discussion above provides an overview of Magellan and its 
investment practices without getting into valuation and returns data 
 
 63. See Fidelity Magellan Fund, Quarterly Holdings Report (Form N-Q) (Feb. 26, 
2016). 
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for the fund’s startup portfolio. This information is presented as part 
of the investor-protection analysis below, in Section II.C.6., which 
assesses the performance of the fund’s venture-style investments and 
weighs the soundness of its valuations. 
II.  INVESTOR-PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
Mutual funds’ recent interest in startups raises concerns about 
investor awareness and fund liquidity, and about the competency and 
motivations of mutual fund managers. While current mutual fund 
regulations partially address these concerns, an analysis of Magellan’s 
holdings, disclosures, and venture-stage firm valuations suggests that 
the current rules provide insufficient protection. 
A. Investor-Awareness Concerns 
Mutual fund investors may not realize that their funds are 
investing in startups. Ordinarily, investors might be relatively 
unconcerned about the exact portfolio holdings of their funds. After 
all, a major attraction of mutual funds is that investing decisions are 
delegated to fund management. Venture investments, however, raise 
special concerns. 
Although investors delegate stock picking to the fund manager, 
law and policy dictate that the investors’ reasonable expectations for 
the contents of their portfolios set the boundaries of that authority. 
Since mutual funds are known for investing in public securities,64 their 
stakes in startups, which are private, are likely contrary to such 
expectations. The only way to ensure that such investments align with 
reasonable expectations is for funds to give meaningful notice to their 
investors. The concern is whether they are providing it. 
While the relevant securities laws make no explicit appeal to 
“reasonable expectations,”65 the principle has purchase in this context 
because of the contractual and fiduciary roots of the relationship 
between the mutual fund managers and the investors.66 The 
representations that management makes about its fund can be viewed 
as outlining the terms of a contract between the fund and its investors, 
 
 64. See Steve Schaefer, Getting Into the Unicorn Boom: 10 Mutual Funds with Stakes 
in Pre-IPO Tech Stars, FORBES (Oct. 14, 2015, 3:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/steveschaefer/2015/10/14/unicorns-funds-fidelity-trowe-uber-dropbox/#4b4409a02a92 [https://
perma.cc/T3G7-VBVM] (describing mutual funds as “players who do the bulk of their 
work in public companies” and “largely composed of more liquid public stocks”). 
 65. See infra Section II.A.1.  
 66. See 15 U.S.C. §	80a-35 (2012). 
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who accept when they purchase their shares,67 and the principle that 
reasonable expectations form contractual boundaries is a central 
tenet of contract law.68 For example, when parties act in ways that are 
counter to the reasonable expectations of their counterparties, they 
violate the duty of good faith.69 Similarly, counterparties are only 
bound to boilerplate terms if such terms comport with reasonable 
expectations.70 By extension, mutual fund investments are only 
appropriate if they match the reasonable expectations of the fund’s 
investors.71 Given their history, investments in public companies like 
Home Depot and Apple would fall within investor expectations, 
while venture-style investments in private companies would likely fall 
outside them.72 Meaningful disclosure—which would expand such 
expectations—is the only cure. 
Part of why such investments would otherwise fall outside 
investor expectations—and why this is worrisome—is the unique risks 
that startups, including unicorns, pose. Since startups are valued 
internally,73 these investments present risks regarding the accuracy of 
their valuations that are foreign to a portfolio consisting of the equity 
of publicly traded firms, where valuation simply equates to market 
prices. While other types of investments might also pose the risk of 
faulty valuations, here that risk is especially acute. Because startup 
valuation is particularly subjective, there is more room for error and 
bias. These unique risks make meaningful notice all the more 
important. For notice to be meaningful, funds must provide more 
than just a note that startups are present; unless investors are also 
 
 67. For a discussion of the contractual nature of the mutual fund relationship, see 
Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, Corporate Versus Contractual Mutual Funds: An Evaluation of 
Structure and Governance, 69 WASH. L. REV. 927, 939–41 (1994). Lawsuits where 
management is alleged to have violated the terms of the relationship, however, are 
typically brought under the securities laws. See Richard L. Levine, Yvonne Cristovici & 
Richard A. Jacobsen, Mutual Fund Market Timing, 52 FED. LAW., Jan. 2005, at 28, 32–33 
(discussing legal theories underlying claims that funds failed to follow announced policies 
regarding market timing). 
 68. See Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1431–32, 1432 n.2 (2014) (listing the 
reasonable expectations doctrine as one of many core concepts of contract law); see also 
Jay M. Feinman, Good Faith and Reasonable Expectations, 67 ARK. L. REV. 525 (2014) 
(analyzing the role and importance of the reasonable expectations doctrine in contract 
law). 
 69. See Feinman, supra note 68, at 557. 
 70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §	211 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
 71. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68.  
 72. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 64.  
 73. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
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informed of the associated risks, they cannot plausibly be viewed as 
informed. 
Fiduciary law buttresses the conclusion that proper notice is 
required. Because of the trust investors bestow in them, mutual fund 
managers are fiduciaries of the funds they manage and, by extension, 
their shareholders.74 Fiduciaries may not violate the reasonable 
expectations of those whom they serve,75 and full disclosure is 
required if candor is called into question.76 These longstanding 
fiduciary doctrines suggest that—since investments in startups would 
come as a surprise, and since the valuation of such investments raises 
concerns about management integrity—mutual fund managers should 
provide full and fair disclosure. 
While investors might not normally focus on the precise contours 
of their fund’s portfolio, startups are different. Core common law 
principles dictate that when managers choose to invest in this unique 
and heretofore largely unprecedented asset class that poses unusual 
challenges, they provide investors with clear notice of the practice and 
the concomitant risks. 
1.  The Relevant Securities Laws and Magellan’s Compliance Efforts 
The securities laws, primarily the Investment Company Act77 and 
the regulations thereunder,78 contain a number of rules designed to 
provide investors with information about fund holdings and to 
prevent misrepresentations with respect thereto. The rules about 
quarterly reports, prospectuses, fund advertisements, and fund 
naming conventions are all relevant. A survey of Magellan’s efforts to 
comply with these regulations gives insight into whether the 
requirements are effective. While the fund provides information 
about startup investments in response to such rules, it does not do so 
in a way that would be helpful to most fund investors. Since 
 
 74. See 15 U.S.C. §	80a-35 (2012) (listing causes of action for breach of fiduciary 
duty); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND 
BROKER-DEALERS 21–22 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V7D8-JU7J]; Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce 
Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the 
Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1017, 1021 (2005). Since the duty is 
technically owed to the fund, private causes of action are derivative in nature. See Joy v. 
North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982); Anita K. Krug, Investment Company as 
Instrument: The Limitations of the Corporate Governance Regulatory Paradigm, 86 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 263, 293–99 (2013); Langevoort, supra, at 1025. 
 75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§	383, 385 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 76. See id. §	390 cmt. a. 
 77. 15 U.S.C. §§	80a-1 to -64 (2012). 
 78. 17 C.F.R. §§	270.0-1 to 270.60a-1 (2016). 
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Magellan’s disclosures appear compliant, the lack of meaningful 
information looks to be the result of a regulatory gap. 
a. Quarterly Reporting Obligations 
Mutual funds are required to file quarterly reports,79 and these 
forms must contain a listing of their investments.80 A knowledgeable 
investor could pull the filings from the SEC’s website and see, at least 
as of quarter-end, what firms were present. Investors might recognize 
the unicorns; if not, an online search of unfamiliar names would 
reveal their presence. As required, Magellan lists its holdings, 
including unicorns and other startups, in these reports.81 
Despite their inclusion, only sophisticated investors would be 
able to pick out the investments in young firms and understand the 
risks they entail. When Magellan and others invest in such companies, 
they typically purchase shares in a particular series of preferred 
stock.82 Since the rules require that funds include the nature of their 
holdings in their quarterly reports,83 Magellan notes when it has 
purchased this type of security.84 While seeing that a fund holds 
shares in a series of a company’s preferred stock is a giveaway to 
sophisticated investors that the issuer of such securities is probably a 
startup, retail investors would likely miss the signal.85 Magellan never 
plainly states that these are investments in venture-stage firms. 
The reports also provide only hints that such firms are private 
and the associated risks. Footnotes appended to these holdings reveal 
that the securities are “restricted,” and Magellan explains therein that 
restricted securities have not been registered under the securities 
laws.86 Unbeknownst to the lay reader, this legal jargon means that 
 
 79. See id. §	270.30b1-5. 
 80. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OMB NO. 3235-0570, FORM N-CSR, Item 6 
[hereinafter FORM N-CSR], http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-csr.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J9HM-34HT]; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OMB NO. 3235-0578, FORM N-Q, 
Item 1 [hereinafter FORM N-Q], https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-q.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W5WA-ALDL].  
 81. See, e.g., FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 5–15 (2016) [hereinafter 
FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 82. See Katie Benner, When a Unicorn Start-Up Stumbles, Its Employees Get Hurt, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/technology/when-a-
unicorn-start-up-stumbles-its-employees-get-hurt.html [https://perma.cc/PKY7-VS3R]; see 
also supra Table 1. 
 83. See 17 C.F.R. §	210.12-12 (2016); FORM N-Q, supra note 80, Item 1.  
 84. See, e.g., FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 5–15. 
 85. Even sophisticated investors would need to conduct further research to be sure. 
Such companies are not the only ones that issue preferred shares and, in fact, public 
companies also issue them. 
 86. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 13.  
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such securities are not publicly traded, and the companies in which 
they represent an ownership interest may not be public either.87 
Several pages later, in a discussion of “Significant Accounting 
Policies,” the fund explains a key risk associated with private 
holdings, noting that restricted securities “may be difficult” to resell.88 
The fund does not further connect the dots in that it never informs 
investors that, when securities are difficult to resell, the fund’s 
valuation of those securities is in its discretion; nor, of course, does it 
mention the inherent problems with the fund having such power. 
While Magellan’s quarterly disclosures may provide enough for 
sophisticated and diligent investors to be wary, this is of little comfort 
given that mutual funds are aimed at the very people who would lack 
the knowledge to find the relevant information in these reports and 
then ascertain its meaning.89 
b. Prospectus Disclosure Requirements 
The securities laws shape the mutual fund prospectus as the 
primary resource for fund investors.90 As such, it would be a 
promising location for disclosure of venture investments. At least in 
Magellan’s case, however, meaningful disclosure is lacking. 
The regulations require that the prospectus discuss, along with 
the fund’s investment objectives, its principal strategies for reaching 
those objectives, and the attendant risks.91 More detailed rules that 
expand on these requirements dictate whether this broad disclosure 
mandate means that funds that invest in startups must so disclose. As 
noted, funds need only describe “principal” strategies.92 According to 
the rules, whether an investment strategy is a “principal” one 
“depends on the strategy’s anticipated importance in achieving the 
Fund’s investment objectives[.]”93 To make this determination, in 
addition to considering the amount of fund assets deployed pursuant 
to a particular strategy, funds are also required to assess “the 
likelihood of the Fund’s losing some or all of those assets from 
 
 87. See Rule 144: Selling Restricted and Control Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/rule144.htm [https://perma.cc/U5ES-82QD]. 
 88. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 21, 26. 
 89. See supra text accompanying notes 46–49. 
 90. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§	80a-1 to -64 (2012); 17 C.F.R. §§	270.0-1 to 270.60a-1 (2016). 
 91. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OMB NO. 3235-0307, FORM N-1A, Item 9, at 11 
[hereinafter FORM N-1A], https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-1a.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SUN8-ATUB]. 
 92. See id. Item 4, at 6, Item 9, at 11. 
 93. Id. Item 9(b)(1), Instruction 2, at 11. 
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implementing the strategy.”94 As part of its principal-strategy 
discussion, funds are to note, among other things, “the particular type 
or types of securities in which the Fund principally invests or will 
invest.”95 
Finally, to meet the risk disclosure obligation, funds must 
describe “the principal risks of investing in the Fund, including the 
risks to which the Fund’s particular portfolio as a whole is expected to 
be subject and the circumstances reasonably likely to affect adversely 
the Fund’s net asset value, yield, or total return.”96 The wording of 
these rules provides funds with a large degree of discretion in 
choosing what to say and how to say it. 
Magellan did not view such requirements as necessitating 
disclosure of its venture investments. In a recent prospectus, the fund 
describes its objective as “capital appreciation.”97 It explains that its 
strategy for achieving capital appreciation is to purchase “growth” or 
“value” stocks or both.98 As for the type of securities that underpin 
this strategy, Magellan says it invests in equities, including “common 
stocks, preferred stocks, convertible securities, and warrants.”99 It 
decides how to allocate the fund’s money through “fundamental 
analysis, which involves a bottom-up assessment of a company’s 
potential for success in light of factors including its financial 
condition, earnings outlook, strategy, management, industry position, 
and economic and market conditions.”100 Finally, Magellan describes, 
in general terms, three categories of fund risks: “Stock Market 
Volatility,” “Foreign Exposure,” and “Issuer Specific Changes”—
none of which mention, or have special relevance to, startups.101 
The fund’s broad descriptions of its strategy and the associated 
risks fail to clearly indicate the presence of startups within the fund’s 
portfolio. Though Magellan does allude to investments in preferred 
stock,102 as noted above, few retail investors are likely to connect this 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. Item 9(b)(1), at 11. 
 96. Id. Item 9(c), at 11. 
 97. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS, supra note 53, at 3. 
 98. Id. at 4. 
 99. Id. at 7. 
 100. Id. Form N-1A also instructs mutual funds to discuss non-principal strategies and 
the related risks in their SAIs. FORM N-1A, supra note 91, Item 16(b), at 19. Magellan’s 
SAI contains no additional disclosures, however, perhaps because the fund views its 
description of its principal strategies and risks as broad enough to capture all of its 
investing activities.  
 101. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS, supra note 53, at 7–8. 
 102. See id. (defining “equity securities” as “common stocks, preferred stocks, 
convertible securities, and warrants” under a heading marked “Description of Principal 
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disclosure to the fund’s practice of investing in emerging firms. Nor 
are the young companies in which the fund invests listed in the 
prospectus.103 While Magellan’s sweeping generalizations about 
strategy and risk theoretically capture venture investing, given the 
historical practices and reputations of funds like Magellan, investors 
would likely view these disclosures as pertaining to public equities.104 
The institutional context means that only direct disclosures would 
reframe investors’ reasonable expectations. 
c. Limitations on Mutual Fund Advertisements 
Extensive rules pertain to mutual fund advertisements,105 
including the contents of their websites,106 but the only relevant 
requirement is that they not be materially misleading.107 This 
backstop rule leaves mutual funds free to describe venture 
investments, but nothing requires them to do so. 
Magellan’s website makes no specific disclosures about its 
investments in young firms.108 Rather, it reinforces the impression that 
Magellan invests solely in big public companies. The top ten holdings 
list a series of household names including Apple, Facebook, and 
Wells Fargo.109 The included “Style Map” describes Magellan as a 
large cap growth fund that focuses on companies valued at more than 
$10 billion.110 The message is that Magellan managers seek to pick out 
the best investments from the largest listed companies.111 
 
Security Types” and acknowledging that “[t]he fund normally invests primarily in common 
stock and securities convertible into common stock, but may also invest in other types of 
securities in seeking its objective”). 
 103. See generally id. (containing no listing of venture firms). 
 104. See supra Section I.B.  
 105. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §	230.482 (2016).  
 106. Mutual funds are subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 
1933, see id., which limit sales practices over the Internet, see THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 1 LAW SEC. REG. §	2:29 & n.11 
(7th ed. 2016).  
 107. See 17 C.F.R. §	230.156(a) (2016). 
 108. See Fidelity Magellan Fund: Summary, supra note 19. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. A particularly interested investor could find the fund’s list of holdings through a 
“Prospectus and Reports” link on its website. See id. Investors are unlikely to take this 
step, however, and, as noted, a portfolio list provides only part of what investors need to 
know to understand the implications of their fund’s foray into venture investing. See 
Section II.A.1.a. 
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d. Fund Name Regulations 
A mutual fund’s name can play an important role in shaping 
investors’ expectations.112 A clear and descriptive name could put 
investors on notice that startups are present; a vague or misleading 
one, on the other hand, could imply just the opposite. Despite their 
potential to inform, the securities laws do not harness fund names as a 
regulatory tool. Rather than prescribe that a fund’s name gives some 
indication of its strategy, the rules police the boundaries of naming 
practices. 
The central rule is that names may not be “materially deceptive 
or misleading.”113 In discussing this language, the SEC has said that a 
name could be misleading if it does not fit the investment strategy of 
the fund.114 Detailed rules police the fit issue in certain contexts.115 
The rules require that if a fund’s name suggests that it will focus its 
investing on a particular type of investment, like stocks or bonds, or a 
particular industry or industries, it must adopt a policy that it will 
invest eighty percent of its assets in accordance with those 
representations.116 Essentially the same rule applies to funds 
purporting to invest in certain geographic regions or countries and 
those purporting to invest in tax-exempt instruments.117 If a fund’s 
name lacks such specificity, the fund has a great degree of latitude. 
The name “Magellan” takes advantage of this freedom. It 
conjures the image of the famed Portuguese explorer, and in doing so, 
suggests boldness and exploration, but ultimately provides no insight 
into what is actually in the fund. 
 
 112. See Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen & P. Raghavendra Rau, Changing Names 
with Style: Mutual Fund Name Changes and Their Effects on Fund Flows, 60 J. FIN. 2825, 
2825 (2005). 
 113. See 15 U.S.C. §	80a-34(d) (2012). 
 114. See Investment Company Names, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,828, 
66 Fed. Reg. 8509, 8514 (Jan. 17, 2001) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §	270.35d-1 (2016)) (“In 
determining whether a particular name is misleading, the Division will consider whether 
the name would lead a reasonable investor to conclude that the company invests in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the company’s intended investments or the risks of those 
investments.”). 
 115. See 17 C.F.R. §	270.35d-1 (2016); see also Investment Company Names, 66 Fed. 
Reg. at 8509 (“Today the Commission is adopting new rule 35d-1 to address certain 
investment company names that are likely to mislead an investor about a company’s 
investment emphasis.”). 
 116. See §	270.35d-1(2)(i); Investment Company Names, 66 Fed. Reg. at 8510. 
 117. See §	270.35d-1(3)–(4). 
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2.  Summary—and a Note on Scale 
Magellan never tells investors that it invests in emerging firms; 
nor does it describe the risks that the practice entails. Even worse, the 
two most likely sources of information—the fund prospectus and 
website—leave investors with the contrary impression. In all 
likelihood, the vast majority of the fund’s participants have no idea 
that Magellan has transformed them into venture capital investors. 
This is problematic even though, as of its March 2016 quarterly 
report, Magellan had $166 million invested in venture-stage firms, 
which is only 1.1% of its $15 billion asset base.118 I argued above that 
notifying investors of venture investments is important because, 
otherwise, such investments would fall outside their reasonable 
expectations, and that adherence to such expectation was particularly 
important here because of the fiduciary character of the manager-
shareholder relationship and the potential for manipulation that such 
investments give rise to.119 The relative size of a fund’s exposure vis-à-
vis the remainder of its portfolio does not alter that analysis. As is the 
case with Magellan, the absolute stakes can still be large. Regardless, 
because of the risk of misconduct, transparency is necessary even if 
stakes are small (in relative or absolute terms).120 
This idea is reflected in central doctrines from corporate and 
securities law, which mandate disclosure when there is the risk of 
manipulation, or where incentives are misaligned, even if the amounts 
involved would otherwise appear inconsequential. Corporate law 
requires complete disclosure of conflicts of interest regardless of 
amount.121 Investment advisers, like Fidelity, are bound by the same 
standard.122 The strict nature of these obligations stems from the 
 
 118. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 12. For the 
calculations underlying this analysis, see Jeff Schwartz, Fidelity Magellan Spreadsheet (on 
file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 64–76. 
 120. Nor does it matter that losses would be spread across the fund’s many investors. 
See Floyd Norris, Pile of Pennies Is Adding Up to a Scandal in Mutual Funds, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 1, 2003, at C1 (discussing how small individual losses result in a windfall for those 
who stand to gain). 
 121. See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §	144 (LEXIS through 2016 Legis. Sess.) 
(providing that conflicts of interest render corporate transactions voidable absent full 
disclosure); see also Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 
1174 (Del. 1988) (“It is a basic principle of Delaware General Corporation Law that 
directors are subject to the fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and disinterestedness. 
Specifically, directors cannot stand on both sides of the transaction nor derive any 
personal benefit through self-dealing.” (emphasis added)). 
 122. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 74, at 22. As part of its fiduciary duty, 
an adviser must fully disclose to clients all material information that is intended “to 
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fiduciary nature of the relationships at issue—management and 
shareholder in the former and investment adviser and client in the 
latter. 
In addition, although “materiality” is the guiding principle for 
disclosure in securities regulation,123 quantitatively immaterial 
information has long been called for when there is the risk of 
shareholder abuse. For example, nearly every detail of executive 
compensation must be disclosed irrespective of the amount.124 
Similarly, all conflict of interest transactions exceeding $120,000 must 
be disclosed—a minute figure for even the smallest public 
companies.125 
More generally, the doctrine of qualitative materiality recognizes 
that misstatements with respect to small amounts might be material if 
they implicate management integrity. According to the SEC, a small 
misstatement would be material, for example, if it increases 
“management’s compensation[,]” “masks a change in earnings or 
other trends[,]” or conceals an “unlawful transaction.”126 
Although Magellan’s venture-style holdings are relatively small, 
they still amount to an enormous sum, and even if the fund was less 
exposed, the potential for misconduct inherent in such investments 
militates in favor of disclosure nonetheless. That the presence of 
venture investments, and the risks they entail, is never made clear to 
investors indicates noncompliance by Magellan or a regulatory gap. 
3.  Inadequate Rules or Compliance Deficit? 
While Magellan could have done more to inform investors, it 
does not appear that the fund fell short of its legal obligations. One 
could argue that, because of the large downside risk associated with 
investing in startups, the strategy qualifies as a “principal” one 
necessitating disclosure in the prospectus.127 But Magellan has a good 
 
eliminate, or at least expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an investment 
adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinterested.” Id. 
(quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963) 
(emphasis added)). 
 123. Cf. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (determining that, 
under the standard of materiality cited in §	240.14a-9, a fact is material if “there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in 
deciding how to vote”). 
 124. See Regulation S-K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. §	229.402 (2016). 
 125. See Regulation S-K, Item 404, 17 C.F.R. §	229.404 (2016). 
 126. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,152 (Aug. 12, 
1999). 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 91–93. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2017) 
1364 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
argument that even large losses would have a small impact on its 
bottom line: even a 50% loss would be one-half of 1% of its total 
assets. One could also argue that Magellan’s website is materially 
misleading, but again the size of the investment cuts against this 
position, and diligent investors can find holdings information linked 
to the fund’s website.128 Finally, it could be argued that the principle 
of qualitative materiality just described suggests that, notwithstanding 
the language of the rules, Magellan should have included more 
information. 
But SEC guidance seems to bless the basic and high-level 
disclosures that Magellan offers. Rule changes in 1998129 eased the 
disclosure requirements with respect to fund strategies in an attempt 
to render the documents less lengthy and complicated.130 In proposing 
the rule, the SEC even expressed concern that companies were 
unnecessarily discussing “illiquid securities” that were not part of a 
fund’s principal investment strategy.131 The best interpretation of 
Magellan’s conduct seems to be that it is complying with the rules, 
such as they are, but the SEC did not foresee the venture-investing 
trend and sanctioned a level of disclosure that leaves investors with 
inadequate information. 
B. Liquidity Concerns 
Startup investing also poses liquidity risk. The lack of a market 
for venture investments runs contrary to the legally grounded investor 
expectation that they will be able to redeem mutual fund shares 
almost immediately.132 By rule, funds are required to redeem their 
investors’ shares within seven days of such requests,133 but the 
 
 128. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 129. See Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies, 
Securities Act Release No. 7512, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,916, 13,916, 13,920 (Mar. 13, 1998). 
 130. See Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies, 
Securities Act Release No. 7398, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,898, 10,900 (Feb. 27, 1997). 
 131. Id. at 10,909. The SEC’s defense of its rule change includes the following: 
The investments described often include instruments, such as illiquid securities, 
repurchase agreements, and options and futures contracts, that do not have a 
significant role in achieving a fund’s investment objectives. Disclosing information 
about each type of security in which a fund might invest does not appear to help 
investors evaluate how the fund’s portfolio will be managed or the risks of 
investing in the fund. This disclosure also adds substantial length and complexity 
to fund prospectuses, contributing to investor perceptions that prospectuses are 
too complicated and discouraging investors from reading a fund’s prospectus. 
Id.  
 132. See Guide for Investors, supra note 8. 
 133. See 15 U.S.C. §	80a-22(e) (2012). 
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industry norm is to do so within one day.134 Since holdings in venture-
stage firms are illiquid, and therefore unavailable to meet such 
requests, if a large percentage of a fund’s portfolio is allocated to 
them, a fund might be unable to meet its obligations in times of stress. 
Such holdings also threaten other aspects of the fund’s strategy. With 
these holdings unavailable for sale, other assets must be traded to 
generate the cash to repurchase shares from investors even if a fund 
would prefer to retain them. 
Venture holdings are among the most illiquid financial assets. 
Like other private firms, there is no active market on which to trade 
such securities.135 Much debt, in contrast, while appropriately 
described as illiquid, is often thinly traded.136 In times of stress, the 
relative illiquidity of debt is problematic, but at least on a routine 
basis there is somewhere to sell. That is not the case with startups. 
To counter illiquidity risk and police the seven-day redemption 
requirement, SEC guidelines limit mutual fund investments in illiquid 
assets to 15% of their portfolios.137 The agency defines such assets as 
those “which may not be sold or disposed of in the ordinary course of 
business within seven days at approximately the value at which the 
mutual fund has valued the investment[.]”138 Because the SEC has 
 
 134. See Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs; Swing Pricing; Re-
Opening of Comment Period for Investment Company Reporting Modernization Release, 
Securities Act Release No. 9922, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,835, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 62,274, 62,277 (Sept. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Liquidity Risk Management]. 
 135. See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 556–60 (discussing the rise and decline of private-
share trading platforms like SharesPost and SecondMarket); see also Katie Benner, 
Airbnb and Others Set Terms for Employees to Cash Out, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/technology/airbnb-and-others-set-terms-for-employees-
to-cash-out.html [https://perma.cc/SL3A-BAEH]. The most likely avenue for a mutual fund 
looking to exit would be a sale back to management or to a private equity buyer. See 
VENTURE CAPITAL: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, STRUCTURES, AND POLICIES 396 
(Douglas J. Cumming ed., 2010). To mitigate liquidity risk, there is evidence that funds 
negotiate for greater redemption rights than other venture-stage buyers. See Chernenko et 
al., supra note 6, at 23 (finding that redemption rights are fifteen percent more prevalent 
in venture funding rounds where mutual funds are investing). Redemption rights, 
however, offer little comfort. See Scott Edward Walker, Demystifying the VC Term Sheet: 
Redemption Rights, VENTUREBEAT (July 4, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2011
/07/04/demystifying-the-vc-term-sheet-redemption-rights/ [https://perma.cc/7W4H-YFTY].  
 136. See Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,813–14 (stating that “most 
money market portfolio securities are not frequently traded” and that “many debt 
securities held by other types of funds do not frequently trade”). 
 137. Revision of Guidelines to Form N-1A, Securities Act Release No. 6927, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 18,612, 57 Fed. Reg. 9828, 9829 (Mar. 12, 1992). 
 138. Id. 
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said that shares in private companies presumptively meet this 
definition,139 startup holdings count against the 15% cap. 
In the context of equity mutual funds, where the remaining 
holdings are predominantly in public companies, this 15% cap 
provides ample protection.140 Thus, so long as funds are complying 
with the rule, there is little concern that they will be unable to meet 
their redemption commitments. And Magellan does not come close to 
the 15% limit. The allocation to venture-stage firms in the period 
studied never exceeded around 1%.141 Outside of one anomalous 
quarter, its total investment in illiquid assets has remained below 
2%.142 If other funds are behaving like Magellan, the illiquidity of 
startup investments does not appear to be a large concern. 
C. Investment and Valuation: Management Competency and Candor 
Although the illiquidity of startups may not pose a major threat 
to the ability of funds to timely redeem investor shares, investing in 
emerging firms and later valuing them raises significant concerns 
about management competence and candor. While regulations do 
little to directly police the competency of portfolio managers to invest 
in and value startups, overlapping securities laws and accounting rules 
contain a number of procedural and disclosure requirements designed 
to instill rigor and honesty into the valuation process. Despite its 
safeguards, however, this regulatory approach appears insufficient. 
Judging by Magellan’s disclosures and valuations, the risk remains 
 
 139. Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding 
Period of Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 6862, 
Exchange Act Release No. 27,928, Investment Company Act Release No. 17,452, 55 Fed. 
Reg. 17,933, 17,940 (Apr. 23, 1990). 
 140. See Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-1A, 57 Fed. Reg. at 9828 & n.9; Jason 
Zweig, Buy the ETF, Not the Mutual Fund, WALL ST. J. (Dec 18, 2015, 1:19 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/12/18/buy-the-etf-not-the-mutual-fund/. Mutual funds are 
also investing in other illiquid assets, which may pose liquidity challenges. See Stein, supra 
note 16; Liquidity Risk Management, supra note 134, at 62,281. For that reason, the SEC 
has proposed new liquidity rules that would complement the fifteen percent cap. See 
generally Liquidity Risk Management, supra note 134, at 62,275–76 (proposing reforms 
that would “address issues arising from modern portfolio construction[,]” provide “a new 
pricing method[,]” and furnish “fuller disclosure of information regarding	.	.	.	[fund] 
liquidity”). 
 141. For the calculations underlying this analysis, see Schwartz, supra note 118. 
 142. See id. This figure represents the portion of Magellan’s portfolio invested in Level 
2 or Level 3 assets. See id. For a discussion of this nomenclature, see infra text 
accompanying notes 205–08. In the fourth quarter of 2012, the fund had 4.4% of its assets 
in one of these two categories, the vast majority of which fell in level 2. See Schwartz, 
supra note 118. 
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that management is making bad investments and then inappropriately 
valuing them. 
1.  Why Improper Valuations Are a Problem 
Bad investments are clearly harmful to fund shareholders, but 
flawed valuations are problematic as well. In fact, because of the 
central role that valuations play in mutual fund operations, the SEC 
has referred to valuation accuracy as “a primary principle underlying 
the Investment Company Act[.]”143 
Once a mutual fund makes an investment, it is required to 
ascribe a value to that investment each day.144 These daily valuations 
are the key component of the firm’s net asset value (“NAV”), which 
is the total value of the fund.145 When mutual fund shareholders 
redeem their shares, they receive the per share NAV.146 This is also 
the price at which fund shares are purchased.147 If this value is 
incorrect, both redeemers and buyers will transact at the wrong 
price.148 
To see the problem with incorrect prices, assume a fund’s 
venture portfolio and, by extension, its net assets, are overvalued. 
Those redeeming their shares will receive too high a price and those 
buying will pay too high a price. The excess returns the redeeming 
shareholders receive are an indirect transfer from the remaining 
mutual fund investors, who see the value of their holdings 
inappropriately diluted.149 The buyers of overpriced shares would also 
suffer if they redeem after the valuation has been corrected. 
On a broader lever, exaggerated valuations cause a misallocation 
of resources in the fund marketplace and between investors and 
management. Buyers may have been wrongfully induced to invest in a 
 
 143. See Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,777. 
 144. See 17 C.F.R. §	270.22c-1(b)(1) (2016). 
 145. See id. §	270.2a-4(a); Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,777 n.480. 
 146. See §	270.22c-1(a). 
 147. See id. 
 148. Unlike the prices of shares in a publicly traded company, which would adjust to 
take into account the trading of sophisticated parties, fund NAVs remain static even if 
they depart from fundamental value. While the disparity conceivably opens up a profit 
opportunity that would be realized when the fund updates its pricing, the opportunity 
would be difficult to exploit because it would be hard for investors to gauge the extent of 
the mispricing and estimate the time frame for correction. 
 149. See Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,778 (discussing the impact 
of redemptions at inflated prices on remaining shareholders). The impact would be felt 
when valuations are rectified. At that point, the NAV will have been artificially reduced 
by the exaggerated payment to the redeeming shareholder without an offset for the 
inflated valuation. 
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certain fund based on the inflated values, which would have 
artificially exaggerated past returns. The inflated figures would also 
have led to inappropriately high compensation for the managers, 
whose pay is based on the NAV, and comes out of the returns of fund 
shareholders.150 The multifaceted reliance on NAVs, and the potential 
harms to investors and other funds that stem from inaccurate 
estimates of its components, underlie the weight placed on getting 
valuations right. 
Valuing venture-stage firms correctly is important even if 
inaccuracies would impact only a small percentage of a fund’s 
portfolio—as is the case with Magellan151 and other mutual funds.152 
While the effect on a fund’s per share NAV may be slight, that minor 
error would impact every investor transaction that takes place at the 
wrong price, magnifying it greatly. Also, even returns from a small 
portion of a fund’s portfolio can meaningfully alter total fund 
returns.153 While large moves can lead to changes measured in 
percentage points,154 in the mutual fund industry, even a basis-point 
change in total returns can alter a fund’s standing vis-à-vis its 
competitors.155 
2.  Fund Manager Competence Concerns 
There are a number of reasons to doubt the capacity of mutual 
funds to make wise startup investments and then value those 
investments accurately. Venture capital investing poses novel 
challenges for fund managers who presumably have built their careers 
investing in public companies. 
 
 150. See Jeff Schwartz, Mutual Fund Conflicts of Interest in the Wake of the Short-Term 
Trading Scandals: Encouraging Structural Change Through Shareholder Choice, 2 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & BUS. 91, 98 (2005). 
 151. See supra text accompanying note 118.  
 152. See KATIE REICHART, MORNINGSTAR, UNICORN HUNTING: MUTUAL FUND 
OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE COMPANIES IS A RELEVANT, BUT MINOR CONCERN FOR MOST 
INVESTORS 4 (2016), http://corporate1.morningstar.com/ResearchArticle.aspx?documentId
=780716 [https://perma.cc/RT6E-SPFA (staff-uploaded archive)]. Katie Reichart of 
Morningstar downplays the significance of mutual-fund investments in unicorns because 
these investments make up a small portion of the industry’s $8.6 trillion in assets. Id. at 1. 
The allocation to startups relative to the size of the industry as a whole, however, is mostly 
irrelevant for public policy.  
 153. See infra text accompanying notes 234–35.  
 154. See infra text accompanying note 235.  
 155. See Large Growth: Total Returns, MORNINGSTAR, http://news.morningstar.com
/fund-category-returns/large-growth/$FOCA$LG.aspx [https://perma.cc/36PW-5HEU 
(staff-uploaded archive)] (showing closely clustered returns for large-growth mutual 
funds).  
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First, skills honed in the public markets do not readily translate 
to the startup world. While the fundamentals of company valuation 
are constant, the particular techniques involved differ greatly across 
these different spheres. Valuing public companies involves poring 
through SEC disclosures and press releases to obtain figures that get 
plugged into models based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(“CAPM”) and its progeny.156 The key valuation figure is profits or 
some stripped down version of it, like EBITDA.157 But startups 
usually have no profits and CAPM plays, at most, a modest role. 
Instead, valuation is based largely on guesstimates of the company’s 
growth prospects.158 The process is much less mathematically rigorous 
and much more dependent on relationships and experience.159 
Second, the security being purchased is a different animal. On 
the public markets, mutual funds typically invest in plain vanilla 
common stock.160 Venture capital investments in preferred shares 
involve much more complicated ownership and liquidation rights that 
would be largely foreign to a public-markets devotee.161 Because 
mutual fund managers do not live in the venture capital world, there 
is a distinct possibility that they are buying at the peak of a startup 
bubble. 
Their inexperience in valuing startups also calls the subsequently 
reported valuations into doubt. When mutual funds invest in publicly 
traded equities, there is no risk of misreporting the carrying value of 
those firms. Because there is a liquid market, and a precise market 
price, the NAV calculation is a matter of arithmetic. Since startups 
are private, however, there is no such market price. Nevertheless, 
mutual funds must estimate a price each day—a task they are ill 
equipped to perform. 
Indeed, even valuation savants could not do what is being asked 
of these venture capital neophytes. It is one thing to price Uber once; 
 
 156. See CHARLES P. JONES, INVESTMENTS: ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 226–33, 
245–70 (11th ed. 2010).  
 157. See id. at 378 n.10.  
 158. See JOSH LERNER, FELDA HARDYMON & ANN LEAMON, VENTURE CAPITAL 
AND PRIVATE EQUITY: A CASEBOOK 181–200 (5th ed. 2012) (describing venture capital 
valuation techniques).  
 159. See Mary Jo White, Chairperson, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at 
the SEC-Rock Center on Corporate Governance Silicon Valley Initiative (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-valley-initiative-3-31-16.html [https://
perma.cc/865C-L4NG] (“Nearly all venture valuations are highly subjective.”). 
 160. See, e.g., FIDELITY MAGELLAN, PROSPECTUS, supra note 53, at 7. 
 161. See generally NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, TEMPLATE: TERM SHEET FOR 
SERIES A PREFERRED STOCK FINANCING (2013) (providing for, among other things, 
governance rights, conversion rights, and preferred liquidation rights). 
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it is another to reevaluate how internal and external events, nationally 
and internationally, shape its prospects each day. It is not as if 
startups are producing daily audited financials and business 
retrospectives for NAV purposes; nor can fund managers scour the 
global press each day for pertinent developments.162 Given these 
limitations, fund valuations for young private companies are 
inherently rough.163 
Startups are even more difficult to value, both initially and over 
time, than other illiquid assets. Mature private firms have historical 
returns to survey. They are also likely to have public companies to 
which they can be readily compared. The whole idea of startups, in 
contrast, is that they lack close comparables.164 
Likewise, as noted above, much debt that is described as illiquid 
is at least thinly traded, which provides some market data.165 In 
contrast, there is no market where startup shares are exchanged and 
prices are publicly disclosed.166 The value of debt can also be more 
easily modeled. Valuing startups is a guessing game, whereas mutual 
funds can use “matrix pricing” for debt instruments, arriving at a 
price “derived from a range of different inputs, with varying weights 
attached to each input, such as pricing of new issues, yield curve 
information, spread information, and yields or prices of securities of 
comparable quality, coupon, maturity, and type.”167 While this process 
does not assure accuracy, there is more to go on in the analysis than 
there is when trying to figure out what Uber is worth. Moreover, at 
least fund managers investing in and later valuing debt instruments 
 
 162. See Lizette Chapman & Drew Singer, Why Mutual Funds Can’t Agree on What 
Unicorns Are Worth, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (May 19, 2016, 1:44 PM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-31/what-s-this-startup-worth-mutual-funds-can-t-get-
their-stories-straight [https://perma.cc/QBG9-MQDH] (“People that aren’t experts at 
valuing private companies are trying to act like experts.	.	.	.	Even when they have less 
information than the VCs.” (quoting CEO of Domo, Josh James)). 
 163. Some funds may be turning to third-party pricing services to assist in valuations. 
See Sarah Krouse & Kirsten Grind, Wall Street Cop Asks Money Managers to Reveal 
Silicon Valley Valuations, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2016, 5:57 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/wall-street-cop-asks-money-managers-to-reveal-silicon-valley-valuations-1481305082. If 
these services are experts in the area, then outsourcing valuations to them relieves 
competence concerns, although the inherent difficulty of the task means such valuations 
would still be guesstimates. 
 164. This is not always the case. Dropbox, for example, has a great public 
comparable—Box. See Box, https://www.box.com/home [https://perma.cc/6N4F-GQW6]; 
see also Michal Lev-Ram, How to Tell the Difference Between Box and Dropbox, 
FORTUNE (Feb. 24, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/02/24/how-to-tell-the-difference-
between-box-and-dropbox/ [http://perma.cc/KF2H-YDX8] (comparing Box and Dropbox). 
 165. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 167. Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,813. 
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for bond funds or money market funds (which are required to invest 
in short-term debt)168 are ostensibly experts in debt. Unlike Magellan 
and its ilk, they are not dabbling in something for which the fund 
lacks historical expertise. 
3.  Fund Manager Candor Concerns 
Mutual funds managers’ ability to accurately estimate the value 
of startups at purchase or each day thereafter is one concern. Worse 
still, there is a significant incentive for funds to massage the reported 
valuations. 
The most obvious abuse would be to exaggerate the value of the 
startups in the fund’s portfolio.169 As previously noted, managers are 
paid based on their assets under management.170 By inflating the 
value of their investments, the asset managers make more. Inflating 
valuations also increases returns, which attracts new investors and 
increases the likelihood that existing ones stay.171 In addition, the 
higher returns allow funds to outpace their peers and the benchmarks 
to which they are compared.172 
 
 168. See 17 CFR §	270.2a-7(d)(1) (2016). 
 169. Hedge funds have recently drawn scrutiny for potentially overvaluing their illiquid 
assets. See Jenny Strasburg, SEC Probes ‘Side Pocket’ Arrangements, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 
2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703832204575210671819894474. 
The incentive to inflate startup valuations may manifest as intentional misconduct or may 
take the form of an implicit, even subconscious, bias toward higher values. Even a small 
bias can have a large effect, however, because minor changes to assumptions can lead to 
major changes to valuations. See LERNER ET AL., supra note 158, at 181.  
 170. See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 560 & n.221. 
 171. See id. at 546 & n.149. 
 172. It could be argued that fund managers would not have an incentive to overvalue 
startups because the firms eventually go public and the price transparency associated 
therewith would necessitate a valuation reckoning. There are several reasons, however, 
why the incentive to inflate would overpower the countervailing force of this contingency. 
First, many firms may never go public. As discussed above, IPOs are becoming less and 
less common. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. If there is no IPO, there is 
never a public-market price. Second, even if a firm goes public, the prospect of short-term 
gains may very well trump the long-term risk. This was one of the many lessons from the 
financial crisis and is seen repeatedly in managerial behavior. See generally Lynne L. 
Dallas, Short-Termism, The Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 
265 (2012) (providing a comprehensive exploration of why financial and nonfinancial firms 
engage in short-termism and how to mitigate it). Moreover, fund managers compensated 
based on the inflated values would not have to give the money back, so even if they need 
to lower values at the IPO, they still would come out ahead. Indeed, a fund manager who 
cheats may be long gone by the time of the IPO, particularly given that the time from 
founding to IPO continues to lengthen. See Begum Erdogan et al., Grow Fast or Die Slow: 
Why Unicorns Are Staying Private, MCKINSEY & CO. (May 2016), http://www.mckinsey
.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/grow-fast-or-die-slow-why-unicorns-are-staying-
private [https://perma.cc/NM4S-V6GB]. Third, the valuations might become a self-
fulfilling prophecy (or managers might harbor this hope). If this were to happen, no 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2017) 
1372 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
Managers could also use their discretion over valuation to 
smooth returns. Rather than consistently report inflated valuations, 
funds could time shift changes so that they appear when most 
advantageous or least harmful.173 Along these lines, funds could 
report negative valuations when the remainder of the portfolio is 
doing well and vice versa. This type of smoothing would reduce 
volatility, which would make the fund appear less risky and therefore 
more attractive. Funds could also smooth against their benchmark—
reporting gains when they need them to keep pace and reporting 
losses when the fund can absorb them without falling behind. 
While there is a similar opportunity for misconduct with other 
illiquid assets, the concern is more salient with startups. The 
slipperiness of venture valuations means there is a wide range of 
plausible estimates, making biased ones difficult to differentiate from 
mistaken ones. The more latitude for abuse, the more tempting it is 
for funds to take advantage. 
4.  Fund Manager Competence Regulation 
The securities laws do little to address the concern that mutual 
fund managers are likely reaching beyond their expertise. Investment 
advisers, like Fidelity, and their representatives are subject to a great 
deal of regulatory oversight.174 While the rules set minimum standards 
of professionalism,175 nothing assures investors that advisers are acting 
in accordance with their core competencies. The primary protection 
comes from disclosure rules, but these provide only limited insight 
into the fund manager’s expertise. The rules require that funds report 
in their prospectus the business experience of their top portfolio 
managers for the last five years.176 
Magellan’s responsive disclosure shows the limitations of this 
rule and bolsters competency concerns. In a recent prospectus, 
Magellan says that the fund’s portfolio manager, Jeffrey Feingold, has 
managed the fund since 2011, and that he has been with Fidelity since 
 
downward adjustment would be necessary. All of these considerations give managers 
reason to inflate values even if IPOs are possible. 
 173. See RIAHI-BELKAOUI, supra note 13, at 56. 
 174. See generally DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION OF 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS (2013), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman
/rplaze-042012.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TJR-KZG8] (delineating the regulatory 
requirements for investment advisers and discussing SEC oversight). Investment adviser 
representatives are largely regulated at the state level. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
supra note 74, at 15, 86–87. 
 175. See DIV. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 174, at 27–28. 
 176. See FORM N-1A, supra note 91, at Items 5(b), 10(a)(2). 
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1997 as a research analyst and portfolio manager.177 These sparse 
disclosures do little to help fund investors evaluate Mr. Feingold; 
worse yet, the limited information provided suggests that he lacks 
experience in venture-style investing. Outside sources confirm this 
impression. According to the Wall Street Journal, prior to working for 
Fidelity, Mr. Feingold was “an equity analyst following the footwear, 
apparel and textile industries.”178 Whatever venture capital 
experience Magellan has does not seem to come from Mr. Feingold. 
While it is possible that the fund has made special hires to address this 
area, investors would never know, as there is no basis on which to 
assess the fund’s overarching expertise as it relates to this specialized 
area.179 
Even though regulation does not directly address competency 
concerns—and what we know about Magellan’s portfolio manager 
reinforces them—the nature of the fund’s investment practices 
provides some comfort. As shown in Table 1, Magellan tends to invest 
in later-stage startups, choosing to usually take part in Series D 
rounds and later.180 These companies are less risky than brand new 
ones181 and more similar to the public firms in which the fund typically 
invests. 
Moreover, Magellan often invests alongside venture capital and 
other private equity funds.182 While these investors are fallible as well, 
that experts in the area are investing on ostensibly the same terms 
gives some legitimacy to the decision to invest. Surprisingly, however, 
Fidelity has served as the lead investor for several of Magellan’s 
investments,183 meaning that it has been the first to sign on and, in 
 
 177. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS, supra note 53, at 18–19. 
 178. Mary Pilon, Fidelity Magellan Gets New Helmsman, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904265504576568793213103996.  
 179. There were no media reports of venture experts moving to Magellan; it also seems 
like an unlikely career move for already successful venture capital fund managers. 
 180. See supra Table 1. 
 181. See John H. Cochrane, The Risk and Return of Venture Capital, 75 J. FIN. ECON., 
Jan. 2005, at 3, 5.  
 182. See, e.g., Uber: Funding Rounds, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com
/funding-round/7a617d3521e9a71816c8d5cbcd4c49b0 [https://perma.cc/FFF3-VTLL (staff-
uploaded archive)] (showing funds that participated in Uber’s Series D round). 
 183. See Fidelity Investments, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization
/fidelity-investments#/entity [https://perma.cc/NS3E-N5XS (staff-uploaded archive)] (showing 
Fidelity leading the rounds for Uber’s Series D, Roku’s Series G and F, and Cloudflare’s 
Series D).  
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those cases, has worked with the entrepreneur to structure the terms 
of the funding round.184 
Magellan’s practice of investing mostly in late-stage startups and 
doing so alongside experienced venture capital investors generally 
lessens competence concerns. But it does not eliminate them. Late-
stage startups are still startups, and even venture experts make 
mistakes. Magellan also makes investments where these mitigating 
factors are dulled. For example, Fidelity funds, including Magellan, 
were the only ones to invest in the Malwarebytes $50 million Series B 
round—and Magellan’s $35 million stake in the round made up about 
twenty-one percent of the fund’s portfolio in private venture-stage 
firms as of March 2016.185 Finally, the safety of being flanked by 
venture-capital firms only lends confidence to the initial investment; 
the fund’s subsequent valuations, regardless of who participated in 
the funding round, remain suspect.186 
5.  Valuation Regulations 
Because mutual funds have been investing in assets without a 
readily determinable market value for years, the risk of incompetent 
 
 184. See Yong Li, Venture Capital Staging: Domestic Versus Foreign VC-Led 
Investments, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF VENTURE CAPITAL 354, 360 (Douglas 
Cumming ed., 2012).  
 185. See Press Release, Malwarebytes, Malwarebytes Raises $50 Million Investment 
from Fidelity (Jan. 21, 2016), https://press.malwarebytes.com/2016/01/21/malwarebytes-
raises-50-million-investment-from-fidelity/ [https://perma.cc/XUS4-XL69]; see also Fidelity 
Magellan Fund, Certified Shareholder Report (Form N-CSR) (Mar. 31, 2016) (showing 
$35 million investment). Though $50 million is quite large for a Series B round, which 
suggests that the company may have raised money prior to its Series A under a different 
naming convention (e.g., Seed-1, Seed-2, etc.) without reporting it, this was not the case. 
See William Alden, Malwarebytes, an Antivirus Start-Up, Raises $30 Million, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (July 10, 2014, 7:32 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/10
/malwarebytes-an-antivirus-start-up-raises-30-million/?src=twr&_r=0 [https://perma.cc
/7XUX-2FUG] (explaining how Malwarebytes raised its initial capital). Arguably, 
however, the round’s size itself makes this investment look more like Magellan’s typical 
late-stage entries. Even so, no venture capital firms participated in the round. See 
Malwarebytes Raises $50M in Series B Funding, FINSMES (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www
.finsmes.com/2016/01/malwarebytes-raises-50m-in-series-b-funding.html [https://perma.cc
/WV77-VV5T].  
 186. A potential check on these later valuations is that, from time to time, Fidelity 
invests with other mutual funds in the startup rounds, which also must publicly report their 
valuations each quarter. See Scott Austin et al., supra note 42. When this is the case, 
Fidelity, in addition to the other funds, may fear reporting outlier figures. This may lead to 
increased caution. Less optimistically, however, the group dynamics may lead to herding 
or outright copying of the first to report. One could also picture a feedback loop, where a 
bubble forms among these funds as valuations ratchet skyward. 
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or biased valuations has long been a concern for regulators.187 As 
such, there is a regulatory regime in place to police pricing practices, 
which consists of both securities laws and accounting rules. The 
disclosures that Magellan produces in response to these 
requirements—while they do not fully illuminate the efficacy of these 
rules—provide grounds for concern. 
a. Securities Laws Regarding Mutual Fund Valuation Practices 
The central valuation rule from the securities laws is that 
“[p]ortfolio securities with respect to which market quotations are 
readily available shall be valued at current market value, and other 
securities and assets shall be valued at fair value as determined in 
good faith by the board of directors of the registered company.”188 
Since startup shares do not have a market price, this means that the 
board needs to posit a “fair value” in “good faith.” 
The SEC has provided guidance on the meaning of both terms. 
According to the agency, “the fair value of a portfolio security is the 
price which the fund might reasonably expect to receive upon its 
current sale.”189 The “current sale” part of this definition means that 
companies must calculate the price that the mutual fund would have 
to accept today if it were to sell, which necessarily includes a discount 
for the stock’s illiquidity.190 
The fair value inquiry is meant to be comprehensive. Board 
members are “to satisfy themselves that all appropriate 
factors	.	.	.	have been considered.”191 Such an analysis is to include 
consideration of both firm-level information and information about 
external events.192 
 
 187. See Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,741 (discussing valuation of 
thinly traded debt). See generally Restricted Securities, Accounting Series Release No. 
113, Investment Company Act Release No. 5847, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,989 (Oct. 21, 1969) 
(discussing valuation of private firms). 
 188. 17 C.F.R. §	270.2a-4(a)(1) (2016) (emphasis added); see also 15 U.S.C. §	80a-
2(a)(41) (2012). 
 189. Letter from Douglas Scheidt, Assoc. Dir. & Chief Counsel, Div. Inv. Mgmt., U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Craig S. Tyle, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst. (Dec. 8, 1999), https://
www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/tyle120899.htm# [https://perma.cc/3JK4-SWBP]. 
 190. See Restricted Securities, Accounting Series Release No. 113, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 5847, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,989, 19,990 (Oct. 21, 1969); Letter from 
Douglas Scheidt, supra note 189. 
 191. Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Companies, 
Securities Act Release No. 5120, Exchange Act Release No. 9049, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 6295, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,986, 19,988 (Dec. 23, 1970). 
 192. See id. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2017) 
1376 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
To comply with its duty to conduct the portfolio valuation in 
good faith, the board members must act in accordance with “the 
duties of care and loyalty that they owe to the fund.”193 More 
specifically, the SEC has instructed as follows: 
a fund board generally would not be acting in good faith if, for 
example, the board knows or has reason to believe that its fair 
value determination does not reflect the amount that the fund 
might reasonably expect to receive for the security upon its 
current sale. In addition, a fund board generally would not be 
acting in good faith if it acts with reckless disregard for whether 
its fair value determination reflects the amount that the fund 
might reasonably expect to receive for the security upon its 
current sale.194 
Even though the rules allocate responsibility for valuation to the 
board and provide it with good-faith guidance, in practice the board is 
not expected to value securities daily. Rather, it must set up195 and 
“continuously review”196 policies and procedures for management to 
follow in conducting the valuations. According to the SEC, “these 
policies and procedures should encompass all appropriate factors 
relevant to the valuation of investments for which market quotations 
are not readily available.”197 
Disclosure requirements buttress the internal controls rules. A 
mutual fund must explain its valuation methodology both in its 
prospectus and SAI.198 Also, when a fund discloses its financial 
statements, which occurs biannually, the fund must include a 
discussion of its valuation procedures in the accompanying notes.199 
 
 193. Letter from Douglas Scheidt, Assoc. Dir. & Chief Counsel, Div. Inv. Mgmt., U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Craig S. Tyle, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst. (Apr. 30, 2001), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/tyle043001.htm [https://perma.cc
/8AJG-RYMS]. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Letter from Scheidt, supra note 189. 
 196. See Letter from Scheidt, supra note 193. 
 197. Inv. Co. Registrants, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶	76,956 
(Nov. 1, 1994). The board’s responsibility to set up internal controls to satisfy its valuation 
obligations has also been read into Rule 38a-1 of the Investment Company Act, which 
requires funds to “[a]dopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to prevent violation of the Federal Securities Laws.” 17 C.F.R. §	270.38a-1 
(2016); Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714, 74,415 (Dec. 17, 2003) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 275, and 279). Mutual funds also have an internal controls 
requirement with respect to financial reporting, which also could be read to implicate fair 
valuation procedures. See §	270.30a-3. 
 198. See FORM N-1A, supra note 91, at Items 11, 23. 
 199. See §	210.6-03. 
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Finally, the values themselves need to be disclosed. Funds must 
independently report the value of each holding every quarter.200 The 
securities law regime thus boils down to a requirement that fund 
boards enact, review, and update policies and procedures to value 
illiquid investments and that funds disclose these protocols and the 
resulting valuations. 
b. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
Mutual fund financial statements must adhere to General 
Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), which include extensive 
rules on fair valuation in Accounting Standards Codification (“ASC”) 
820.201 ASC 820 is somewhat more prescriptive than the securities 
rules. It specifies general valuation methodologies (either based on 
discounted income flows or comparisons with similar financial 
assets)202 and a hierarchy of inputs in applying those methodologies.203 
The key to the hierarchy is the distinction ASC 820 makes between 
observable inputs, which are preferred, and unobservable inputs, 
which are disfavored. Observable inputs are based on market data, 
whereas unobservable inputs are based on the reporting company’s 
assessment of “the assumptions that market participants would use 
when pricing the asset.”204 In addition to the observable/unobservable 
dichotomy, the ASC also groups inputs into three “Levels.”205 The 
disfavored unobservable inputs are categorized as Level 3.206 Because 
there is no market for startup shares, their valuation is based on these 
inputs of last resort. 
As with the securities laws, disclosure rules supplement the 
procedural rules. The ASC requires a description of the fund’s 
valuation methodology207 and a breakdown of total assets into 
categories corresponding to how they were valued (i.e., through Level 
1, Level 2, or Level 3 inputs).208 
 
 200. See FORM N-CSR, supra note 80; FORM N-Q, supra note 80; see also §	210.12-12.  
 201. See generally FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
UPDATE: FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT (TOPIC 820) (2011), https://asc.fasb.org
/imageRoot/00/7534500.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4AB-WWXL] (describing “common 
requirements for measuring fair value and for disclosing information about fair value 
measurements”). 
 202. See id. at 27. 
 203. See id. at 40. 
 204. Id. at 50. 
 205. See id. at 42–51. 
 206. See id. at 50; see also Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,858 n.1466 
(providing an overview of the three-level structure). 
 207. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 201, at 59. 
 208. See id. at 61. 
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Finally, auditors lend their assessment. Mutual funds must 
include audited financial statements209 and an audited schedule of 
investments in their annual reports.210 For the audits, rather than 
confirm final valuation figures for difficult-to-value assets, the 
auditors review whether “the fund’s valuation method was 
appropriate in the circumstances and applied consistently.”211 
In requiring that companies use certain valuation techniques, 
describe their inputs, and subject their analyses to auditing, the 
accounting rules require a degree of specificity beyond that which is 
called for by the more flexible and general securities law rules. Even 
so, Magellan’s compliance illustrates that these rules do not add 
meaningful transparency and that manipulation concerns remain. 
c. Magellan’s Compliance with the Valuation Rules 
Magellan’s disclosures shed little light on how it values its 
venture investments. A recent prospectus contains several paragraphs 
on valuation, but the only relevant disclosure is that “[i]f market 
quotations, official closing prices, or information furnished by a 
pricing service are not readily available or, in the Adviser’s opinion, 
are deemed unreliable for a security, then that security will be fair 
valued in good faith by the Adviser in accordance with applicable fair 
value pricing policies.”212 An expanded discussion in the SAI provides 
no further insight into startup valuations.213 
The disclosures accompanying the fund’s financial statements 
provide more detail, but are still too general to be useful. For 
example, in an annual report for the fiscal year ending on March 31, 
2016, the relevant disclosures are found in two paragraphs in Note 3 
to its financial statements titled “Significant Accounting Policies.”214 
The first paragraph is broadly responsive to the securities laws 
requirements: 
 
 209. See 17 C.F.R. §	210.3-18 (2016); FORM N-1A, supra note 91, at Item 27(b)(1).  
 210. See FORM N-CSR, supra note 80, Item 6. 
 211. INV. CO. INST., INDEP. DIRS. COUNCIL & ICI MUT. INS. CO., FAIR VALUATION 
SERIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO FAIR VALUE 19 (2005), https://www.ici.org/pdf/05_fair
_valuation_intro.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HNM-P4V4]. For other assets, the auditors will 
independently verify valuations. Id. Fair value audits are recognized within the accounting 
industry as among the most complex and problematic. See Emily E. Griffith, Jacqueline S. 
Hammersley & Kathryn Kadous, Audits of Complex Estimates as Verification of 
Management Numbers: How Institutional Pressures Shape Practice, 32 CONTEMP. ACCT. 
RES. 833, 833 (2015).  
 212. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS, supra note 53, at 9. 
 213. See FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
25–26 (2016). 
 214. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 21–22. 
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The Board of Trustees (the Board) has delegated the day to 
day responsibility for the valuation of the Fund’s investments to 
the Fidelity Management & Research Company (FMR) Fair 
Value Committee (the Committee). In accordance with 
valuation policies and procedures approved by the Board, the 
Fund attempts to obtain prices from one or more third party 
pricing vendors or brokers to value its investments. When 
current market prices, quotations or currency exchange rates 
are not readily available or reliable, investments will be fair 
valued in good faith by the Committee, in accordance with 
procedures adopted by the Board. Factors used in determining 
fair value vary by investment type and may include market or 
investment specific events. The frequency with which these 
procedures are used cannot be predicted and they may be 
utilized to a significant extent. The Committee oversees the 
Fund’s valuation policies and procedures and reports to the 
Board on the Committee’s activities and fair value 
determinations. The Board monitors the appropriateness of the 
procedures used in valuing the Fund’s investments and ratifies 
the fair value determinations of the Committee.215 
These boilerplate disclosures stop short of providing substantive 
information about the valuation process. They note that the board has 
put policies and procedures in place, but do not describe their 
content. They also note that the board has delegated valuation to a 
committee of “Fidelity Management & Research Company,” which is 
the fund’s manager,216 but do not describe what the committee does 
with any specificity. The second paragraph, which responds to the 
accounting rules, adds little additional value: 
Equity securities, including restricted securities, for which 
observable inputs are not available are valued using alternate 
valuation approaches, including the market approach and the 
income approach and are categorized as Level 3 in the 
hierarchy. The market approach generally consists of using 
comparable market transactions while the income approach 
generally consists of using the net present value of estimated 
future cash flows, adjusted as appropriate for liquidity, credit, 
market and/or other risk factors.217 
Like the first paragraph quoted, this disclosure essentially confirms to 
the public that Magellan is following the applicable rules, but 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS, supra note 53, at 5. 
 217. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 22–23. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2017) 
1380 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
provides no real transparency. The disclosure suggests that startups 
are valued using Level 3 inputs, but does not describe the inputs or 
the valuation technique the fund uses. Magellan’s disclosures appear 
to follow the letter of the rule, yet sophisticated investors—let alone 
average investors—are left with little insight into the actual valuation 
process. 
6.  Magellan’s Valuations218 
The final way to assess the risk to investors that remains despite 
the relevant securities and accounting rules is to consider Magellan’s 
ongoing valuations themselves, which might suggest incompetence, 
exaggeration, or returns smoothing. To gain insight into whether 
Magellan’s startup valuations may be suspect, this Section first 
presents summary data on the fund’s quarterly valuations. It then 
describes the returns and risk profile of the fund’s startup portfolio 
(which are both functions of the underlying firm valuations) and 
compares these attributes to the remainder of Magellan’s portfolio, 
the public market, and the venture capital industry. Where Magellan-
held startups went public, this Section also compares the fund’s 
valuations to the market values of the same firms on the day of their 
public offerings. While this collection of data, and the associated 
comparisons, does not show that Magellan was dishonest or inept, 
putting the fund’s venture investments in context does not extinguish 
such concerns, and in fact, reinforces them.219 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 218. Unless a source is otherwise indicated, the calculations underlying the data 
presented in this Section are on file with the North Carolina Law Review. See Schwartz, 
supra note 118; EDGAR Search Results: Fidelity Magellan Fund CIK#: 0000061397, supra 
note 60; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 219. It is beyond the scope of this Article to more formally test the hypothesis that 
Magellan is manipulating its valuations. The data presented herein, though, suggests that 
the additional data collection and statistical analysis necessary for doing so might be 
worthwhile. 
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a. Magellan’s Valuations and Valuation Practices 
Between the second quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of 2016, 
Magellan conducted 126 valuations of its venture investments. This is 
one valuation each quarter for each of its holdings in emerging firms. 
In 41% of the valuations, the fund chose to leave the estimated value 
unchanged from the previous quarter. It increased valuations 32% of 
the time and decreased them 27% of the time. Changes came in all 
sizes. The fund made nineteen changes of less than 5% in either 
direction. Its smallest change to a single holding was –.9% and its 
largest was +141%. While the number of positive as compared to 
negative adjustments was reasonably similar, the scale of the positive 
adjustments was much greater than the negative ones. For example, 
Magellan shows one loss of over 25%, but sixteen quarterly gains 
surpassing that figure. The histogram in Figure 2 below illustrates 
these practices. 
 
Figure 2: Magellan Percent Change in Valuation Each Quarter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Magellan’s approach to valuation evolved over time. As the bar 
chart in Figure 3 suggests, the fund was much less likely to change 
valuations when it first began investing in venture-stage firms. From 
June 2012 to June 2013, Magellan changed the value of only one 
holding (out of fifteen opportunities). In contrast, from the first 
quarter of 2015 until the first quarter of 2016, it changed forty-three 
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valuations (leaving only seventeen unchanged). The chart below also 
shows how Magellan’s holdings increased over time. 
 
Figure 3: Magellan Valuation Changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Risk and Return Data for Magellan’s Portfolio of Venture-
Stage Firms 
Magellan’s filings indicate that its venture portfolio has been 
tremendously successful. Table 2 shows its initial investment in such 
firms, its final valuation during the period I reviewed, and the 
associated annual return. What stands out is just how well Magellan 
reports to have done: the fund shows an average annual return of 
42%.220 
 
 220. This is a weighted geometric average—a measure that takes into account how 
much Magellan invests in each security and the timing of returns. See ROGER D. 
IBBOTSON ET AL., DUFF & PHELPS, 2016 SBBI YEARBOOK: STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS AND 
INFLATION 6-2 (2016) (presenting an explanation of geometric means).  
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Table 2: Fidelity Magellan Fund Startup Returns 
 
Company 
Initial Investment 
($) 
Final Quarterly 
Valuation ($) 
Yearly Return 
(%) 
bluebird bio, Inc.(a) 
1,711,000 
(July 23, 2012) 
13,489,000 
(Sept. 30, 2015) 
116 
Cloudflare, Inc. 
3,502,000 
(Nov. 5, 2014) 
2,681,000 
(Mar. 31, 2016) 
–17 
DocuSign, Inc.(b) 
90,000 
(Oct. 21, 2013) 
241,000 
(Mar. 31, 2016) 
50 
99,000 
(Mar. 3, 2014) 
112,000 
(Mar. 31, 2016) 
6 
30,000 
(Mar. 3, 2014) 
34,000 
(Mar. 31, 2016) 
6 
11,000,000 
(June 29, 2012) 35,456,000 
(Mar. 31, 2016) 
36 
71,000 
(Mar. 3, 2014) 
1,831,000 
(Mar. 3, 2014) 
2,080,000 
(Mar. 31, 2016) 
6 
HubSpot, Inc.(c) 
15,000,000 
(Oct. 25, 2012) 
35,707,000 
(Dec. 31, 2015) 
44 
KaloBios 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.(d) 
8,000,000 
(May 2, 2012) 
4,991,000 
(Dec. 31, 2013) 
–44 
Malwarebytes Inc. 
35,000,000 
(Dec. 21, 2015) 
35,000,000 
(Mar. 31, 2016) 
0 
Meituan Corp. 
10,000,000 
(Jan. 26, 2015) 
12,214,000 
(Mar. 31, 2016) 
19 
Mobileye N.V.(e) 
8,878,000 
(Aug. 15, 2013) 
46,431,000 
(Dec. 31, 2014) 
135 
Nutanix, Inc. 
6,193,000 
(Aug. 26, 2014) 
6,093,000 
(Mar. 31, 2016) 
–1 
Pure Storage Inc. 
2,121,000 
(Aug. 22, 2013) 
4,148,000 
(Mar. 31, 2016) 
29 
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Company 
Initial Investment 
($) 
Final Quarterly 
Valuation ($) 
Yearly Return 
(%) 
Roku, Inc. 
11,000,000 
(May 7, 2013) 
18,570,000 
(Mar. 31, 2016) 
20 
5,000,000 
(Oct. 1, 2014) 
5,882,000 
(Mar. 31, 2016) 
11 
Uber Technologies, 
Inc. 
15,000,000 
(June 6, 2014) 
47,159,000 
(Mar. 31, 2016) 
88 
Average Yearly Portfolio Return 42221 
Standard Deviation 53222 
(a) bluebird bio, Inc.’s final valuation does not include the almost $6 million worth of 
shares Magellan sold in the third and fourth quarters of 2015; the returns calculation, 
however, accounts for the sales. 
(b) Magellan’s June 29, 2012 investment of $11,000,000 and March 3, 2014 
investment of $71,000 in DocuSign, Inc. were combined in Magellan’s reporting. 
(c) HubSpot, Inc.’s final valuation does not include Magellan’s sale of about $8 
million worth of shares in the first quarter 2015 and about $2 million worth of shares 
in the third quarter of that year. Sales proceeds, however, are included in the returns 
calculation. 
(d) Magellan purchased an additional $3 million worth of shares in KaloBios 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in the first quarter of 2013. The returns calculation takes the 
additional purchase into account. 
(e) Mobileye N.V.’s valuation does not include $1000 worth of shares that Magellan 
held until the first quarter 2015. The returns figure, however, takes this holding into account. 
 
 221. This is the average referenced above, see supra text accompanying note 220, 
rather than a mean of the above annual returns. 
 222. This is the standard deviation of the startup portfolio’s annual returns. 
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The bar chart in Figure 4 shows why Magellan has performed so 
well. Most of its largest wagers yielded impressive returns. The few 
investments resulting in losses involved relatively small stakes. 
 
Figure 4: Magellan Startup Investments and Final Valuations223 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following Figure shows the returns associated with 
Magellan’s valuations. 
 
Figure 5: Magellan Startup Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 223. Figure 4 combines multiple rounds of investments in Roku, Inc. and DocuSign, 
Inc. Otherwise, it reflects the dollar figures in Table 2. 
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Any discussion of portfolio performance must also account for 
risk. Standard deviation is the typical measure, which is based on the 
principle that the wider the dispersion of outcomes (in this case, 
returns), the greater the risk.224 A higher standard deviation indicates 
a wider dispersion.225 In Magellan’s case, the standard deviation of 
yearly returns was fifty-three percent. This figure is based on a small 
number of observations, but like annual returns data, it nevertheless 
provides a numerical basis for comparison across different asset 
classes over the same time period. 
c. Comparative Analysis of Magellan’s Returns and Risks from 
Its Startup Portfolio 
Magellan’s venture investments significantly outperformed the 
venture capital industry, the public market, and the remainder of its 
portfolio. Table 3 shows how Magellan’s performance stacks up 
against these comparables for the three years where there is complete 
venture capital data. 
 
Table 3: Yearly Return Comparisons226 
 
 Magellan 
Startup 
Portfolio 
(%) 
Venture 
Capital 
Industry (%) 
Magellan 
Total 
Returns (%) 
S&P 500 
Returns (%) 
June 30, 2012–
June 30, 2013 –6 6.5 20 (–.06) 21 
 
 224. See IBBOTSON ET AL., supra note 220, at 6-3. 
 225. See id. 
 226. The venture capital returns in Table 3 are internal rates of return (“IRRs”) based 
on data from Preqin. See PREQIN, 2015 PREQIN GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE 
CAPITAL REPORT: SAMPLE PAGES 7 (2015), https://www.preqin.com/docs/samples/2015-
Preqin-Global-Private-Equity-and-Venture-Capital-Report-Sample-Pages.pdf [https://perma
.cc/JQV9-PFJR]; PREQIN, PREQIN PRIVATE EQUITY BENCHMARKS: VENTURE CAPITAL 
BENCHMARK REPORT 19 (2013), https://www.preqin.com/docs/reports/Q2_2013_Venture
_Capital_Benchmark.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G76-US86]; PREQIN, THE Q1 2016 PREQIN 
QUARTERLY UPDATE: PRIVATE EQUITY 11 (2016), https://www.preqin.com/docs
/quarterly/pe/Preqin-Quarterly-Private-Equity-Update-Q1-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc
/XY4Q-D45C]; PREQIN, THE Q3 2016 PREQIN QUARTERLY UPDATE: PRIVATE EQUITY 
11 (2016) [hereinafter PREQIN, Q3 PRIVATE EQUITY UPDATE], https://www.preqin.com
/docs/quarterly/pe/Preqin-Quarterly-Private-Equity-Update-Q3-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc
/J8L4-DHX4]. 
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 Magellan 
Startup 
Portfolio 
(%) 
Venture 
Capital 
Industry (%) 
Magellan 
Total 
Returns (%) 
S&P 500 
Returns (%) 
June 30, 2013–
June 30, 2014 65 25.9 29 (+.15) 25 
June 30, 2014–
June 30, 2015 101 20.5 11 (+.56) 7 
Over Three-
Year Period 59 18 20 (+.22) 17 
 
As Table 3 shows, from June 2012 to June 2015, Magellan far 
outpaced the venture capital industry, earning a 59% return 
compared to the industry’s 18%. Such performance is even more 
remarkable because, as shown in Table 1, Magellan has usually 
invested in later rounds, which should generate lower returns (and 
lower risks).227 Also, venture capital returns follow a power-law 
distribution: a few funds earn outsized returns while the remainder 
falter.228 That Magellan finds itself on the right side of this equation is 
surprising,229 given that newcomers and non-venture funds that dabble 
in private equity tend to do poorly.230 
 
   IRR calculations in the venture capital industry typically include interim 
valuations and are not solely based on limited partner cash flows. See JOE STEER & COLIN 
ELLIS, BVCA, ARE UK VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY VALUATIONS OVER-
OPTIMISTIC? 4 (2011). The numbers contained in parentheses in the Magellan total 
returns column are estimates of the startup portfolio’s contribution to the total return each 
period. Total returns and S&P 500 returns are based on data from Morningstar. See 
Fidelity Magellan, MORNINGSTAR, http://beta.morningstar.com/funds/XNAS/FMAGX
/quote.html [https://perma.cc/84VT-PPJE (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 227. See Cochrane, supra note 181, at 5. 
 228. See DIANE MULCAHY, BILL WEEKS & HAROLD S. BRADLEY, EWING MARION 
KAUFFMAN FOUND., WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY	.	.	.	AND HE IS US 21 (2012), http://
www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/2012/05
/we_have_met_the_enemy_and_he_is_us.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EWK-ML49]. 
 229. See supra Table 3. Based on Cambridge Associates’ historical data, Magellan’s 
returns would likely place it in the top quartile of venture capital funds. In the period from 
1981–2014 (thirty-four years), this group had annual returns of over 30% in only eight 
instances and over 40% in only five instances. See CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS., U.S. VENTURE 
CAPITAL INDEX AND SELECTED BENCHMARK STATISTICS 8 (2016), http://
40926u2govf9kuqen1ndit018su-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Public-
2016-Q1-USVC-Benchmark-Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D83-F7H6].  
 230. See JOSH LERNER, PRIVATE EQUITY RETURNS: MYTH AND REALITY 21–24, 28, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/Session%20III%20-%20Lerner%20FINAL.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/4DBJ-UHZS]. University endowments are the exception. See id. at 21–28. 
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Also notable is that the strong venture capital returns depicted in 
Table 3 belie a long history of lackluster performance in the industry. 
While funds that began in 2010 have a median return of 14.5%, those 
that began in 2005 show returns of only 3%.231 A Kauffman 
Foundation study from 2012 concluded, based on returns data, that 
venture funds “haven’t beaten the public market for most of the past 
decade.”232 Magellan is thus a standout in the industry at a time when 
the industry is doing particularly well. 
Magellan’s venture returns also far exceed the stock market as a 
whole and Magellan’s public investments. As shown in Table 3, 
Magellan’s 59% return in the three years from June 2012 through 
June 2015 dwarfs the 17% return on the S&P 500 index and 20% 
return on the rest of the fund’s portfolio. Moreover, as noted above, 
from June 2012 until March 2016, Magellan earned 42%.233 The S&P 
500 returned about 14%, and the remainder of Magellan’s portfolio 
returned about 14.6% over the same period. 
The returns on Magellan’s startup investments have played a 
small but noticeable role in the fund’s overall performance. As Table 
3 indicates, the venture portfolio caused the overall return to fall six 
basis points from June 2012 to June 2013 and to rise fifteen basis 
points and fifty-six basis points in the following two years, 
respectively.234 Table 3 does not show how the venture investments 
impacted quarterly returns. As with annual returns, the change was 
usually a matter of basis points, but one quarter—the first quarter in 
2014—the fund had a 614% return on its startup portfolio, and that 
quarter the venture portfolio increased the aggregate return by more 
than 3% (from 7.8% to 11%).235 
Magellan’s high venture returns have been accompanied by the 
aforementioned 53% standard deviation,236 which implies a high level 
of risk. The S&P 500 had a standard deviation of only 9% over the 
three years included in Table 3. Historically, the standard deviation is 
20% for large-cap stocks and 32% for small caps.237 Perhaps more 
 
 231. See William Alden, Venture Capital Outpaces Buyouts in Investment Returns, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 21, 2015, 12:59 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/21
/venture-capital-outpaces-buyouts-in-investment-returns [https://perma.cc/XLX8-8ZQ8]. 
 232. MULCAHY ET AL., supra note 228, at 6. 
 233. See supra Table 2. 
 234. The small overall effect despite the large venture returns owes to the relatively 
small portion of the portfolio allocated to startups. See infra Section II.A.1.b. 
 235. The 614% figure is an annualized return. For the underlying calculations, see 
Schwartz, supra note 118. 
 236. See supra Table 2. 
 237. See IBBOTSON ET AL., supra note 220, at 2-6 Exhibit 2.3. 
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surprising, the standard deviation of Magellan’s returns also exceed 
those of venture capital funds, even though it focuses primarily on 
later-stage startups, which should be more stable.238 For the three 
years included in the chart above, the annual standard deviation in 
venture capital returns is 10%, close to the venture capital average of 
11.7%.239 
These numerical comparisons, however, overstate the riskiness 
of Magellan’s investments. Though less tidy, a better way to look at 
risk in this context is to focus on the frequency and depth of losses. 
This perspective causes Magellan’s risk to all but disappear. Only 
three of the fund’s investments have failed to generate a positive 
return, and only one—KaloBios Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(“KaloBios”)—is severely underwater.240 
This is in contrast to venture capital as a whole, where three out 
of four investments fail to return investor capital.241 Magellan’s focus 
on more mature firms likely explains part of its success in avoiding 
steep losses, but the increased stability of such firms should be 
accompanied by decreased returns—which has not been the case for 
Magellan.242 The fund appears to have done something that has long 
eluded industry veterans. In its first foray into venture capital, it has 
invested almost exclusively in winners. While not all of its investments 
have been home runs, they have overwhelmingly yielded positive 
returns. The spread of returns implies riskiness, but the risk that 
matters is largely absent. 
When further refined, the data continues to present this picture 
of success. The above analysis of Magellan’s total returns from its 
venture-type portfolio includes returns derived from after startups 
have gone public. While a complete picture of Magellan’s returns 
from its startup portfolio is a useful yardstick, since the valuations for 
publicly traded firms and the post-IPO returns that stem therefrom 
are based on market prices, excluding this portion of the fund’s 
 
 238. See Cochrane, supra note 181, at 5. 
 239. This is based on the variation in annual venture-capital returns reported by 
Cambridge Associates. See CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS., supra note 229, at 6.  
 240. See supra Table 2.  
 241. Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 Out of 4 Start-Ups Fail, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10000872396390443720204578004980476429190.  
 242. See Cochrane, supra note 181, at 5. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2017) 
1390 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
venture returns from the data presents a more precise picture of 
Magellan’s pre-IPO valuation practices.243 
When the public valuations are excluded, the average annual 
return drops from 42% to 30%.244 The new figure, while somewhat 
less impressive, still compares very favorably to the venture capital 
industry (18.2%),245 to the S&P 500 (14%), and to the remainder of 
Magellan’s portfolio (14.6%). Reduced risk accompanies the reduced 
returns. The standard deviation drops to 31% and the fund’s biggest 
loss disappears. Its investment in KaloBios only showed signs of 
trouble after it went public. The reason for the overall reduced 
returns and risk in the pre-IPO data despite KaloBios’s struggles 
post-IPO is that Magellan’s investments in bluebird bio, Inc. (which it 
held for more than two years after its IPO) and Mobileye N.V. (which 
it held for a couple of quarters) skyrocketed after going public.246 
d. Comparative Analysis of Firm-Level Valuations—Before and 
After the IPO 
Comparing the performance and risk of Magellan’s venture-stage 
portfolio to those of alternative investments is one way to assess the 
fund’s valuations. Another approach is to compare the fund’s private 
valuations for firms that went public to the IPO prices for those firms 
or, better yet, to the prices for those firms after the first day of 
trading. The latter would be more telling because it reflects market 
prices rather than the price paid by the IPO syndicate, which typically 
reflects a discount.247 A good match between Magellan’s price and the 
trading price would seem to indicate that Magellan is appropriately 
 
 243. Bluebird bio, Inc., HubSpot, Inc., KaloBios Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Mobileye N.V., 
and Pure Storage Inc. have gone public since Magellan’s initial investments in these 
companies. See supra Table 1. 
 244. See Schwartz, supra note 118. 
 245. This 18.2% figure is the return for the venture-capital industry for the three years 
ending December 2015. PREQIN, Q3 PRIVATE EQUITY UPDATE, supra note 226, at 11. Its 
performance would place Magellan in the top quartile of venture-capital funds in about 
70% of years. See supra note 229.  
 246. See Callum Borchers, Cambridge Biotech Raises $101M in IPO, BOS. GLOBE 
(June 20, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/06/19/bluebird-bio-ipo-soars-
first-day-trading/HxDvtzuKMlIf1CL4bAPm0L/story.html [https://perma.cc/8TEA-TMQC]; 
Gabriella Coppola & Leslie Picker, Mobileye Raises $890 Million as Largest Israeli IPO in 
the U.S., BLOOMBERG (July 31, 2014, 7:53 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2014-07-31/mobileye-raises-890-million-as-largest-israeli-ipo-in-the-u-s- [https://perma.cc/WYH3-
PJHJ]. 
 247. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Why I.P.O.’s Get Underpriced, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (May 27, 2011, 10:48AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/why-i-p-o-
s-get-underpriced/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/E6ED-2R67]. 
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tracking the value of its investments.248 Table 4 shows this 
information. 
 
Table 4: Initial Public Offerings Data249 
 
Company 
Highest 
Internal 
Valuation ($) 
Final Internal 
Valuation ($) 
IPO Price 
($) 
End of First 
Day of 
Trading 
bluebird bio, Inc. 
.78 
(March 31, 
2013) 
.78 (14.80) 
(March 31, 2013 / 
May 28, 2013) 
17 
(June 18, 
2013) 
26.91 
(June 19, 
2013) 
HubSpot, Inc. 
10.17 
(Mar. 31, 
2014) 
7.50 (22.50) 
(Sept. 30, 2014 / 
Nov. 20, 2014) 
25 
(Oct. 9, 
2014) 
30.10 
(Oct. 9, 
2014) 
KaloBios 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. 
3.40 
(June 30, 
2012–Dec. 
31, 2012) 
3.40 (12.11) 
(Dec. 31, 2012 / 
Feb. 28, 2012) 
8 
(Jan. 31, 
2013) 
7.95 
(Jan 31, 
2013) 
Mobileye N.V. 
34.90 
(Sept. 30, 
2013–June 
30, 2014) 
34.90 (6.98) 
(June 30, 2014 / 
Aug. 29, 2014) 
25 
(July 31, 
2014) 
37 
(Aug. 1, 
2014) 
Pure 
Storage 
Inc. 
18.67 
(June 30, 
2015) 
15.30 
(Sept. 30, 2015 / 
Nov. 30, 2015) 
17 
(Oct. 6, 
2015) 
16.01 
(Oct. 7, 
2015) 
 
 
 248. Venture capitalists typically price their preferred shares as if they were common 
stock, ignoring the value of the downside protection. Robert P. Bartlett III, A Founders’ 
Guide to Unicorn Creation: How Liquidation Preferences in M&A Transactions Affect 
Start-Up Valuation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 123, 
125 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Claire A. Hill eds., 2016). When it is clear that a 
company is going public, however, the distinction evaporates because protection from 
downside risk is irrelevant. Private and public valuations should, therefore, largely align 
(although a liquidity discount to reflect any lockup period would be defensible). 
 249. The “Highest Internal Valuation ($)” and “Final Internal Valuation ($)” columns 
are derived from Magellan’s quarterly reports. To access these reports, see EDGAR 
Search Results: Fidelity Magellan Fund CIK#: 0000061397, supra note 60. The first dates 
listed in the “Final Internal Valuation ($)” column are the quarter-end dates for the 
quarterly reports reflecting the noted valuation. The second dates listed are the actual 
filing dates for those reports. The prices in parentheses in that column represent what 
the fund’s reported price equates to accounting for stock splits at or around the time of 
the IPO and for the rate at which the fund’s holdings covert into common stock. For  
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What stands out is how far off Magellan’s valuations were from 
the market values of the same firms at the end of the first day of 
trading. Magellan overvalued KaloBios by 34%. The fund’s valuation 
was low, but reasonably close for Pure Storage Inc. (5% off), and far 
too low for HubSpot, Inc. (34% off), Mobileye N.V. (430% off) and 
bluebird bio, Inc. (82% off). 
These discrepancies are difficult to explain. SEC rules provide 
funds with sixty days from the quarter-end or more to file their 
quarterly reports250—and Magellan takes full advantage. As Table 4 
shows, in four out of five cases, this meant that Magellan filed its 
report listing its valuation estimate for the firm after its IPO. In the 
other case, bluebird bio, Inc., Magellan filed about three weeks prior. 
Thus, with the exception of bluebird bio, Inc., Magellan had actual 
price data to inform its valuations. So informed, the fund’s valuations 
for the quarter ending prior to the IPO should closely align with the 
subsequent, but closely timed, market prices. 
Looking more closely at the data, in two cases, Mobileye N.V. 
and KaloBios, Magellan never changed its quarterly valuations prior 
to the IPOs. HubSpot, Inc.’s and Pure Storage Inc.’s valuations were 
lowered in the months prior to the public offering (which might 
suggest an adjustment in anticipation of the event and the value 
clarity it brings). As for bluebird bio, Inc., Magellan only held the 
firm for three quarters prior to its IPO and marked up the stock by 
fifty-six percent in the quarter prior to the offering. 
A valuation process that, as law requires, takes into account all 
available information should, it would seem, hew closely to proximate 
market data. Because Magellan’s valuations for these five firms prior 
to their IPOs show no discernable pattern that would help to explain 
why that was not the case, the discrepancies remain a puzzle. 
 
 example, Magellan’s valuation for bluebird bio, Inc. for the first quarter of 2013, which 
ended March 31, 2013, was $.78. Magellan filed the quarterly report listing this valuation 
on May 28, 2013. See Fidelity Magellan Fund, Certified Shareholder Report (Form N-
CSR) (Mar. 31, 2013). bluebird bio, Inc. conducted a one-for-18.967 reverse stock split 
shortly before its IPO, and Magellan’s shares were eligible to convert on a one-to-one 
basis. See BLUEBIRD BIO, INC., PROSPECTUS 10 (June 18, 2013). Taking this into account, 
the $.78 per share valuation, as of March 2013, equates to a $14.80 valuation at the time of 
the IPO. 
 250. The first and third quarter reports are filed on Form N-Q, which have a sixty-day 
deadline. See FORM N-Q, supra note 80, General Instructions, Section A. Form N-CSRs 
are filed for the alternate quarters. These must be filed in seventy days. See 17 C.F.R. 
§	270.30e-1 (2016) (requiring semi-annual reports within sixty days of each half-year 
period); FORM N-CSR, supra note 80, General Instructions, Section A (requiring filing not 
later than ten days after delivery of a semiannual report). 
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e. Returns Smoothing 
As noted above, rather than inflate valuations so as to 
exaggerate returns, funds could smooth returns by shifting the timing 
of when they reflect gains and losses.251 If a fund is smoothing within 
its portfolio, it would show up as an inverse correlation between the 
fund’s return on its startup portfolio and the return on its remaining 
investments. If a fund is smoothing against a benchmark (the S&P 500 
in Magellan’s case), this would show up as an inverse correlation 
between the performance of Magellan’s startup investments and the 
remaining portion of the fund’s performance relative to its 
benchmark. As illustrated in the scatterplots below, however, the 
relevant figures showed little correlation.252 
 
Figure 6: Startup Quarterly Portfolio Returns Compared to 
Remaining Quarterly Portfolio Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 251. See supra Section II.C.3. 
 252. The correlation coefficient for Figure 6 is –.05. 
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Figure 7: Startup Quarterly Portfolio Returns Compared to Relative 
Benchmark Performance253 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One reason smoothing might not appear is that, when Fidelity 
invests in a startup, it frequently spreads its holdings across more than 
one fund.254 Thus, while Fidelity might not be smoothing with respect 
to Magellan, it might be doing so with respect to the fund family as a 
whole—timing the valuation of gains and losses to the benefit of 
whichever fund in the family is most in need of support—and such 
behavior would not reveal itself in the above analysis. 
f. Interpretation of Magellan’s Valuations 
The data above does not provide a clear answer as to whether 
Magellan is inappropriately valuing its startups. There is no evidence 
of smoothing and no pattern of overvaluation in the pricing of firms 
that went public. The comparison of private valuations to IPO prices 
does, however, call the rigor of the valuation process into doubt, and 
the comparison of venture-stage portfolio returns to other 
investments supports concerns about misconduct. 
Upwardly skewed valuations are one of only a few explanations 
for the fund’s success in the venture capital arena. And the alternative 
explanations, while plausible, are not overly compelling. It would be 
tempting to dismiss Magellan’s success as the byproduct of a startup 
bubble, but this would be too easy. While many have voiced concerns 
 
 253. The correlation coefficient for Figure 7 is –.03. 
 254. See REICHART, supra note 152, at 3. 
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that startups are overvalued,255 to attribute Magellan’s performance to 
a bubble requires an explanation for why Magellan is benefiting more 
from it than others in the venture capital industry.256 No convincing 
explanations present themselves. It is possible that Magellan is more 
skillful, but this seems improbable given the fund’s inexperience. This 
leaves luck. While anything is possible over a relatively short period 
of time, ascribing Magellan’s performance to good fortune is not a 
particularly satisfactory explanation either. 
Surprisingly strong relative performance does not prove 
manipulation or disprove other explanations, but it is notable 
nonetheless. The valuation data could have shown that the venture 
investments were an unrelenting drag on returns. While this would 
not have disproven manipulation, it would have run counter to the 
theory that mutual funds are using such investments and their 
discretion over valuations to boost their returns in an absolute sense 
and in comparison to index funds. Such a finding would also have 
eased regulatory concerns. Even if funds are manipulating valuations 
to show results that are less bad than they really are, doing so would 
be part of a self-defeating investment strategy and therefore probably 
a short-term problem. Instead, the finding of superior performance 
lends credence to overvaluation concerns. 
III.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This Article proves, as much as a case study can, that mutual 
fund holdings in venture-stage firms and the processes funds employ 
to value these investments are not disclosed in a useful manner. It 
also makes the theoretical case for skepticism regarding the 
valuations mutual funds announce for their startup holdings each 
quarter. To assess the theoretical case, this Article reviews Magellan’s 
valuations and measures them against several benchmarks. While 
Magellan’s valuations and the associated returns are comparatively 
and surprisingly high, there is insufficient evidence to pin such success 
on misconduct. Nevertheless, the above combination of theory and 
 
 255. See, e.g., Andy Kessler, A Dearth of Tech IPOs May Mask Bubble Trouble, WALL 
ST. J. (July 9, 2015, 6:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-dearth-of-tech-ipos-may-
mask-bubble-trouble-1436482198; Steven Davidoff Solomon, Expect Some Unicorns to 
Lose Their Horns, and It Won’t Be Pretty, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 19, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/01/20/business/dealbook/expect-some-unicorns-to-lose-their-horns
-and-it-wont-be-pretty.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/MS25-RYC7]. 
 256. If there is a bubble, mutual funds might be part of the reason for why it exists. 
Their presence may exert upward pressure on prices because they have vast resources and 
their inexperience and discretion over subsequent valuations may lead to price 
insensitivity. 
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evidence—along with the mutual fund industry’s already sizeable 
footprint in the venture capital space and its expanding taste for 
venture-type investments257—provides enough reason for concern to 
begin a conversation about reform.258 
While disclosure is almost always the recommended cure for 
securities concerns, that alone would likely be insufficient in this 
instance. Many, even most, investors likely pay scant attention to 
mandated fund disclosures or even the content of fund websites.259 
While this does not mean the pursuit of improved disclosure is in 
vain, it does suggest that substantive reforms to how mutual funds are 
permitted to do business should be the centerpiece and that any new 
disclosure recommendations should be calibrated to the reality of low 
investor engagement. 
A. Reforms to the Valuation Process and Related Disclosures 
Currently, securities rules require funds to value their portfolios 
daily, and the accounting requirements as to methodology allow funds 
to do so through any reasonable means.260 Because funds are required 
to constantly value their securities, this is a pure “mark-to-market” 
accounting structure, and because the process of marking to market is 
what creates the opportunity for manipulation, a modified cost-based 
accounting structure would mitigate such concerns. 
Funds could be required to hold these investments at their 
acquisition cost, unless the fund believes a valuation change is 
warranted based on publicly available information. For instance, 
startups often announce their implicit valuation based on new rounds 
of financing.261 When this occurs, funds could be required to update 
their valuations accordingly. Management shakeups, acquisitions, and 
even industry news could warrant changes. 
 
 257. See supra text accompanying note 43.  
 258. There is a regulatory tradeoff with respect to empirical evidence of misconduct: 
the more evidence one collects, the better the case for regulation, but the more harm that 
has already been done. While the case here is mostly theoretical, since the startup 
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ahead of the industry. 
 259. See ABT SRBI, supra note 26, at 56, 78. 
 260. See 17 C.F.R. §	270.22c-1 (2016).  
 261. See, e.g., Press Release, Genesys, Genesys Announces Investment from Hellman 
& Friedman at $3.8 Billion Valuation (July 21, 2016), http://www.genesys.com/about
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As a complement to the new valuation rules, funds could be 
required to disclose each quarter what public information caused the 
change. This is a rather mild form of intervention because it leaves 
pricing in the discretion of the fund and anticipates market-based 
revisions.262 But the rationale for revised valuations would be subject 
to public scrutiny, which would incentivize funds to provide more 
conservative (and more careful) estimates—ones they could publicly 
defend if called upon. Most mutual fund investors would be unlikely 
to notice these disclosures, but the audience in this case would be the 
SEC, class-action lawyers, and the media. Indeed, the SEC and major 
newspapers have already begun to take note of mutual fund valuation 
practices.263 
Funds would likely argue that such disclosures pose competitive 
concerns. As the opaque nature of their disclosures suggest, funds like 
to leave the public in the dark as to their practices. Similarly, when 
reporters have asked funds about valuation techniques, they are often 
met with silence or platitudes.264 The disclosures proposed here, 
however, would not compromise fund valuation models; only the 
publicly available information on which changes are based would be 
open for review. Such complaints are, therefore, unconvincing. 
This proposal is the least intrusive from an array of options. The 
most extreme alternative would be to prohibit mutual funds from 
making venture-style investments, and instead allow only exchange-
traded funds (“ETFs”) and closed-end funds to do so. While similar 
to mutual funds, the shares for these pooled investments are publicly 
 
 262. Rules could also require disclosure of whether the fund is using a third-party 
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traded, which means any disconnect between fund valuations and 
market value would be accounted for in the price of the shares.265 
Like in the public markets, unsophisticated shareholders would be 
protected by the market price.266 The problem is that this would cut 
many ordinary investors out from startup investing. ETFs and closed-
end funds do not have the same footprint as mutual funds, and they 
are not as common in 401(k) plans.267 Without clear evidence of 
misconduct, it is better to mitigate the risk of abuse than deprive 
people of the opportunity to indirectly invest in young companies. 
One could allow mutual fund participation, but remove the risk 
of misconduct, by taking valuation discretion away from the funds. 
Instead, they could be required to hold the investments at cost. In 
contrast to the modified cost-based proposal presented above, with 
this option, the market value would only enter the NAV calculation if 
there is a liquidity event, such as the sale of shares in an emerging 
firm. The problem, and the reason I propose milder intervention, is 
that this change would open an arbitrage opportunity for 
sophisticated investors. Suppose a company enters a later funding 
round at an increased valuation. After the round, the fund’s recorded 
NAV would be artificially low. Arbitrageurs could purchase shares in 
the fund in anticipation of when the value would actually be realized. 
The same is true on the flip side. A requirement to hold the firms at 
cost would mean that funds would carry inflated valuations for firms 
in cases where there has been bad news. Arbitrageurs could sell fund 
shares only to repurchase them if the firm eventually goes 
bankrupt.268 
The underlying problem is that a purely cost-based system 
creates a predictable divergence between announced values and 
market values. In a typical public market, the actions of sophisticated 
traders help retail investors as their conduct brings prices in line with 
market values. But in the mutual fund context, the NAV stays the 
same. The profits of the arbitrageurs come at the expense of long-
 
 265. See How to Invest in a Closed-End Fund, WALL ST. J., http://guides.wsj.com
/personal-finance/investing/how-to-invest-in-a-closed-end-fund/ [https://perma.cc/U2XB-
PWTC]. 
 266. See Jeff Schwartz, The Law and Economics of Scaled Equity Market Regulation, 
39 J. CORP. L. 347, 362 (2014). 
 267. See How to Invest in a Closed-End Fund, supra note 265. 
 268. Even with small allocations to emerging firms, large valuation discrepancies could 
develop, which would render such strategies profitable. For a discussion of the economics 
of arbitrage, see Schwartz, supra note 266, at 376.  
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term, presumably retail, investors.269 Under the modified cost-based 
approach I propose, however, while a difference between market 
price and reported price difference might exist in theory, it would be 
impossible to exploit because the information on which to do so 
would not be publicly available.270 
A similar alternative would be to require updating, when and 
only when, there are certain outside events (e.g., a new funding 
round, an acquisition, bankruptcy). The ability to alter valuations 
subject to these constraints would allow greater flexibility than the 
purely cost-based alternative. While this approach would reduce the 
arbitrage problem, it would not eliminate it. Sophisticated investors 
could buy or sell based on whatever events are not included on the 
list. 
Additional research might indicate that more restrictive 
measures are appropriate, but at this point, when research is still thin, 
incremental change seems most prudent. The suggested alteration to 
the valuation process, and the accompanying disclosure rule, would 
provide a great deal more investor protection than today’s regime 
without significant upheaval.271 
B. Startup Portfolio Disclosure 
A limitation to the changes discussed thus far is that they would 
not address the investor notice problem. The SEC and sophisticated 
investors would be more aware of fund valuation practices, but the 
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presence of venture-stage firms in fund portfolios, and the risks they 
pose, would still be unknown to most investors. As noted above, this 
problem is difficult to fix because investors are notoriously 
uninterested in fund disclosures.272 With this in mind, rules should 
mandate disclosures across an array of platforms, including both fund 
advertisements and SEC forms, so as to reach as many investors as 
possible, and require that such disclosures be simple and clear enough 
so that those investors that come across them understand that the 
fund is investing in startups and the risks involved. This practice 
would provide actual notice to some investors and constructive notice 
to all.273 
Such an approach starts with a rule that instructs funds with 
venture investments to include something like the following 
disclaimer whenever they present their fund strategy, including in its 
website and prospectus: “This fund contains investments in startup 
companies. Such investments pose unique risks, which are discussed 
in further detail in the ‘Startup Portfolio’ section of our Statement of 
Additional Information.” 
This section would then describe such risks. It would explain that 
such firms are illiquid and that this may make it difficult for funds to 
redeem mutual fund shares on demand. Funds could appropriately 
tailor this discussion according to the portion of the fund’s portfolio 
so invested. Funds would also be required to explain the valuation 
challenges with startups. In particular, funds should indicate that 
valuing startups is inherently subjective and that exaggerated 
valuations lead to excess compensation for management, which 
means that the interests of the fund’s managers do not necessarily 
align with those of its shareholders. 
The fund would then explain the process it uses to value startups 
and address concerns regarding its discretion and potential bias. In 
this part, the fund would describe what it does rather than what it may 
do. For example, at least one fund tries to use market behavior of 
similar public companies to estimate emerging firm values.274 When 
this is the case, then firms should acknowledge it. One problem with 
today’s disclosures is that fund’s provide a broad discussion of their 
process for valuing assets without a readily identifiable market value. 
Because they apply this process to a range of assets, the discussion is 
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so general as to be meaningless. This proposal would require that 
firms specifically discuss what they do to fair value startups. To 
accommodate competitive concerns, funds would not be required to 
disclose the details of their valuation models. In the example above, 
for instance, a fund using public valuations to inform private ones 
would not be required to list which public company or companies it is 
using as a match for which startup. 
The SAI would also inform investors that the current list of 
holdings, including valuations, can be found in the fund’s quarterly 
reports. In addition, it would explain that the fund, as required by 
law, updates valuations when, and only when, publicly available 
information warrants doing so, and that it reports the basis of such 
changes each quarter. In the quarterly reports, startups should be 
specially marked as such with a footnote indicating that investors can 
learn more about such investments and their risks in the fund’s SAI. 
This specific and clear disclosure regime would offer far more insight 
than the generalized and superficial information found in Magellan’s 
reports today. 
Even though the SEC has expressed concern about the length 
and complexity of fund disclosures, venture investing warrants special 
treatment. As discussed throughout this Article, such investments are 
uniquely illiquid and difficult to value and are quite different than the 
typical equity mutual fund holdings or even holdings in debt and 
other illiquid securities. Though the substantive reforms discussed 
above would mitigate concerns in connection with the startup 
valuation process, they would not eliminate them or the need for 
transparency with respect to funds’ venture portfolios. 
CONCLUSION 
A case study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s compliance effort and 
investing practices suggests that the current regulatory structure does 
not adequately address the investor-protection concerns raised by 
mutual fund investments in startups. The study suggests that most 
fund investors are unaware that they have indirectly invested in these 
companies, which is particularly worrisome because fund valuations 
for these firms might be biased and inaccurate. A review of 
Magellan’s valuations, and the performance related thereto, lend 
preliminary support to these concerns. 
To respond to the investor-protection gaps, I propose greater 
limitations on how funds may value their investments in startups and 
enhanced disclosure requirements with respect to the valuation 
process, the presence of such firms in fund portfolios, and the risks 
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that investing in startups entails. While mutual funds have only 
recently begun imitating venture capital firms, they already own 
billions of dollars worth of equity in early-stage companies,275 and 
their exposure to this asset class is rising sharply.276 Rather than wait 
until the concerns outlined in this Article lead to clear investor harm, 
regulators can respond to the endemic problems with such 
investments in the mutual fund context and enact preventive 
regulations to mitigate the risks. 
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